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Development Rights Transfer:
An Exploratory Essay
John J. Costonist
Chicago's Old Stock Exchange

Building, a 13-story architectural

landmark of international stature, was demolished in 1972 to make
way for a pedestrian 45-story office tower on one of the Chicago
Loop's prime

business locations.

In Manhattan, the

Tudor Parks,

described by The New York Times as "two quiet green islands, sus
pended above the compacted chaos of East 42nd Street in the pri
vately-owned Tudor City development,"1 are targeted

as

the site

of luxury high-rise buildings. P uerto Rico's Phosphorescent Bay, a
unique ecological resource whose waters explode at dusk with the
luminescence of billions of tiny dinoflagellates, is threatened with
imminent degradation by industrial development on the still virgin
lands that encircle the Bay.
These and countless other imperiled resources seem to have little
in common at first glance. Some are man-made, others nature's own.
Their locations run from bustling downtown sites to

once remote

rain forests and nature preserves. They are cherished for purposes as
diverse as landmark preservation, open space maintenance, and pro
tection of the natural environment.
Each is vulnerable, however, b e cause it is a low density resource
situated where the marketplace demands a high density use. This
clash between resource protection and the development juggernaut
defines the contours of a national land use dilemma. The recurring
failure

of

conventional land

use

practice2 to

accommodate these

warring forces has resulted in demands for reform that, all too often,
are nurtured more by apocalyptic rhetoric than by deliberate reflection.
For most of this century constitutional jurisprudence exacerbated
t Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. A.B. 1959, Harvard
College; LL.B. 1965, Columbia University.
I. N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1972, at 46, col. 4.
2. Recognition of the inadequacy of existing techniques i s apparent in reports of
influential land use study commissions; see, e.g., THE USE OF LAND, A CIT I ZEN'S POLICY
GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH (W. Reilly ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as USE OF LAND]; THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING: A DECENT HOME, H.R. Doc. No. 34, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); and proposed legislative reforms illustrated by the American
Law Institute's Model Land Development Code, see ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT
CooE (Tent. Draft Nos. 2-5, 1970-73), and by national land use bills sponsored by the
Nixon administration, see S. 924, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), and by Senator Henry
Jackson, see S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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the conflict. While few modern courts denied that resource protec
tion was a legitimate governmental end, mos t scrutinized

the eco

nomic consequences of public programs adopted for this purpose.
Measures that cut sharply into the p rofitability of p rivate property
risked invalidation as uncompensated takings improperly implem ented
under the state's police power. Among the many r ationa l es advanced
to distinguish the valid exercise of
pensated takings,3 perhaps the most

the police power from uncom
widely accepted is the harm /

benefit test, suggested by Professor Freund in 19044 and u pdatcd by
Professor Dunham in 1958,5 which requires com p en sat ion if the regula
tion creates a community benefit, but allows no recovery if it pre
vents a harmful land use.6
Programs that, without compensation, aim at resou rce protection
by forbidding landowners to convert their land from lo\\·- to high
density development are prime candidates for invalidation under the
harm / benefit test.7 Worthy though the preservation of a landmark
or nature preserve may be, this rationale insists that t h e community
resort to its eminent domain power unless it can show that the pro
posed higher density development will create harms that the com
munity may proscribe under the police power. To do otherwise would
compel the owner of the threatened resource to improve the com3. l'or a collection of legal writings exploring the distinction between the police
p ower and the power of eminent domain, see Kusler, Ope11 Space Zo11i11 g: Valid Regu·
lation or Invalid Taking, 57 MINN. L. REV. l, 9 n.26 (19 i2).
4. See E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER 546-47 (1904).
5. See Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Pla1111i11g, 58 C oLU:<r. L. RH.
651, 663-69 (1958).
[I]t may b e said that the state takes property by eminent domain because it is
6.
useful to the p u blic, and u nder the police p o w er because it is harmful . . . .
l'rom this results the difference between the power of eminent domain and the
police power, that the former recog niz es a righ t to compensation, while the latter
qn principle does not.
E. P'REUND, supra note 4, at 546-47.
7. See, e.g., State ex rel. Marbro Corp. v. Ramsey, 28 Ill. App. 2d 252, l ii l'\.E.2d
246 (1960) (mandating issuanc e of a demolition permit for the Garrick Theater, a Chicago
. 2d 71l (Mc. J 9i0 ) (setting
Sc?ool of Architect re landmark); State v. Johnson, 265 .\.
�
.
aside a permit
<lemal and an injunction p roh ibi ting the filling of appellants' land
preparatory to sale); Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2 d 341
(19�>4) (inva�id3:ting an al!lendment which zoned an area of the town as a rural single·
residence d1stncl); Morns County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-T roy Hills
Twp ... 40 !'.'.·J·. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963) (invalidating zonino- intended LO p revent con
stmct10n w � hm an ecologically sensitive marshland); Keyst';;ne Associates v. Moer<ller,
19
.Y.2d 18, 224 N.E.2d 700, 278 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1966) (declaring invalid a statute
.
.
wh1 ch created a pnvate corporation and vested it with power to condemn the :VIetro·
.
poht31n Opera �ou�e property and appropriate it for u se as a public auditorium,
.
despite a prov1s1011 m the slatut e for compens ting the property o w ne r s who had in
3:
.
.
tended to construct an office bmldmg
on the site). But see McCarthy v. City of �Ia n ·
hat�an Beach, �l. Cal. 2
? �7 9, 264 P.2d 932 (1963) (refusing to invalidate a zoning
ordmance perm1t tmg plamt1ffs' ocean-front property to be used only for recreational
purp<;Jses). The Marbro court bluntly summed up the conflict:
It 1s laudable to attempt to preserve a landmark; however, it becomes unconscion·
able when an unwilling private party is req ui red to bear the expense.
State ex rel. Marbro Corp. v. Ramsey, supra at 256, 171 N.E.2d at 247.
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munity's lot and would freeze his property in i�s current low density
status while not similarly restraining the range of development op
tions open to his neighbors. Moreover the "harm" prevented is a
far cry from the nuisance-like analogue contemplated by Freund and
Dunham. Rather, it is the termination of a community benefit
fortuitously

provided by the owner-to make possible

subsequent

development which, if undertaken by his neighbors, would not be
objectionable on nuisance-related grounds.
A community's options under the harm/benefit test have not been
enviable. Because scarce public dollars are
. typically earmarked for
social needs more compelling than resource protection, eminent do
main has usually not been feasible. Two alternatives remained: the
police power and moral suasion.

Wholesale attrition of America's

natural and man-made amenities is

poignant evidence

of the in

adequacy of these traditional options.
Portraying the current land use climate or its likely evolution in
vites confusion akin to that which befuddled Lewis Carroll's Alice
in her maddening game of croquet. Some commentators speak of a
"new mood in America";8 others of a "quiet revolution."0 However
styled, ferment in the land use field is now so pervasive that, like
Alice's flamingo, hedgehog, and card soldiers, nothing seems to stay
put for very long, least of all the point at which judges will draw
the line between the police power and the power of eminent domain.
Indeed, some recent opinions appear to have all

but defused the

compensation requirement as an e f fective constitutional limitation on
government's exercise of its land use powers .10
8. See

UsE OF LAND, supra note 2, at I 7.
See F. BossELMAN &: D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN

LAND UsE CoNTROL
(Council on Environmental Quality 1971).
10. See, e.g., Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956
(!st C ir. 1972) (sustaining a six-acre minimum lot zoning restriction on a tract pur
chased for recreational home development); Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San hancisco
llay Conserv. &: Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 55i, R9 Cal. Rptr. 8!)7 (1970) (sustaining
denial of a fill permit for development along San hancisco Bay); Golden v. Planning
Board, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (l!li2) (sustaining development
regulations authorizing a municipality, i11ter alia, to prohibit subdivision development
for up to 18 years}; Just v. Marinette County. 56 Wis. 2d i, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (sus·
taining prohibition of residential development in state wetlands zone); cf. fo re Spring
Valley Development, 300 A.2d 736 (Mc. I 9i3) (sustaining application of Maine Site Lo·
cation of Development Law to .rnbdivided 92-acre private site); Poromac Sand &: Gravel
Co. v. Governor of Maryland, 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241, cert. de11ied, 409 U.S. 1040
(19i2) (sustaining prohibition of dredging on pr iva te lands within state wetlands zone);
Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891 (Mass. 19i2) (sustaining a
virtual prohibition of residential development, citing combined flood plain zoning and
ecological resource protection grounds). The wave of judicial decisions in the 19iO's
sustaining environmentally-based land use regulation against the taking charge plays
a prominent role in the remarkable proposition, recently adrnnced by three land use
commentators, that the "regulation of the use of land, if reasonably related to a valid
public purpose, can never constitute a taking." F. BoSSELMAN, D. CALLIES &: J. BANTA,
T11E TAKING lssm: 238 (19i3} (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as TAKING].
9.

77

The Yale Law

Vol. 83: 75, 1973

J ournal

This turnabout is the result of five converging trends in the land
use field. The most i mportant trend is environmentalism, which pro
vides the impetus for an expansion of government's land use po"·ers
paralleled only by the United States Supreme Court's 192() decision
i n Euclid

v.

Ambler Realty

Corn j1any11 upholding the constit11tionality

of zoning under the police power. Environmentalists believe

th a t

types of development threaten environmental quality. Thus,

all

bifur

cating development int o harmful and nonharmfnl cate g ories is, for
them, untenable.12 Instead, the individ ual d evelopment decision, like
Tennyson's flower

in the crannied

wa ll ,

should not be perceiv ed

piecemeal, but must be viewed in terms of its relationship

to the

larger context of which it is a part. Th i s p remise has become a sta ple
a mong environmental economists13

and has mad e heacl,,·a y in the

courts as well.14 Once development itself becomes suspect, little can
be excluded from the category of harmful land uses.
The benefit concept also experiences a trou hksome metamor pho
sis. When resource protection was regarded as essentially a frill, a
goal which the government could pursue

only on

basis, resort to eminent domain made sense.

a

compensated

Recently upgraded in

the literature and, increasingly, by the courts to a concern of u tmost
social

priority,

resource protection might

now

be attained

under

the harm / benefit test by means of the police pm,cer irrespective oE
economic hardships suffered or windfalls reaped by individual land
owners.15
11. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
12. Seep. 100 infra.
13. See P. BARKLEY & D. SECKLER, Eco:-.o:-.uc GROWTH AND EN\'!RO'\:\IE:-ITAL DECAY:
THE SOLUTION BECOMES THE PROllLL\1 32 (19i2):
The a ccumula tio n �£ pe opl e and their appurtenances in limited, technolo gically non
expandable s pa ce 1s perh ap s the ultimate resource constraint and the ultimate
p robl em of pollution.
See generally T. CROCKER & r\. Roc F.Rs, E:-.vtRONMENTAL EcoNoM1cs (19il); .J. DALES,
POLLUTION, PROPERTY, AND PRICES (1968); £. l\1JSHAN, THE COSTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
(1967).
14. Fo r e�a m plc a federal court of appe al s looked squarely to the environmentalist
?
.
pre1�us e for its ra t 10.nale in sustaining a six-acre minimum lot size req u ire men t of a
.
.
rustle New H a mpshll' e commumty agamst the charge, i11ler alia, that it eff ec te d an
u nco mpens at e d taking:
We �-eco gniz� as within the general welfare, conc erns relating to t he construction
and mtegrat10n of hundreds of n ew homes which would ha\·e an irrevocable effect
o':1 . the area's ecological balance, destroy scenic values, decrease open spa ce , sig·
.
mllcantly change the rural �hara cter of the small t own, pose substantial fin ancial
.
burd�ns on the t�wn f �r �ohc�, fire, sewe r and road services, and open the way for
.
.
the tides of weekend
visitors
who would own second homes. If the federal gov
.
ernment Itself ha� thought th e s� concerns to be within the genera l welfa re (ci ting
.
the
a t � o nal Env1�onmental Policy Act), we can n o t say that [this community] can·
.
not s1.nulaily consider such values and reflect th e m in its zoning
ordinance.
Ste�l Hill Developme1!t, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 .F 2d
956, 961 (1st Cir. 1972).
.
b. Compare Mo1 ns County Land Improvem ent Co. v. Parsippany
-Trny Hills Twp.,
N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963), wzth Just v. Marinette County, 56 W
i s . 2<l 7, 201 N.W.2d
161 (1972). In Morns, Judge Hall, perhaps the most informed
sitting jmist in land u s e

J'l'.

�O
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Heightened citizen expectations concerning the preservation of en
vironmental amenities have come at a time of growing municipal
impoverishment. Traditional methods of public finance have proven
inadequate to generate the funds required to fulfill these expectations
and to meet the expanded welfare responsibilities of government in
the twentieth century. Sympathetic to the fiscal difficulties of local
governments, the courts have increasingly chosen to acquiesce in a
broadening· of the police power rather than force the scuttling of
worthy public programs.1 6
Third, courts have belatedly recognized that land development is
a lmsiness. Seemingly obvious, this point has been obscured by the
almost religious mystique that has set land development apart from
other forms of business activity since the apotheosis of property
ownership by Blackstone and other early English comrnentators.17
Extolling the sacredness of private property, these apologists were
not thinking of Boise Cascade, Zeckendorf, and Levitt but of the
private citizen whose property was the principal barrier between
himseH and the whims of an arbitrary state. In land-rich, laissez
faire America, however, the courts ignored this distinction, thereby
affairs, was unwilling to classify development within an ecologically sensitive area as
a "harm," despite his recognition of the social benefits that would flow from the area's
maintenance in its natural state. He therefore invalidated the challenged noncompen
satory measure. The Just court, on the· other hand, expressly disagreed with Judge Hall,
finding instead that development within ecologically sensitive areas is indeed a "harm."
Sustaining a near-blanket prohibition on d evelopment in privately owned lauds within
wetlands zones, it reasoned that "an owner of land has no absolute and unlimited
right to change the essential natural character of his land so as to use it for a purpose
for which it was unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights of others,"
and concluded that _the police power may be used "to prevent harm to public rights
by limiting the use of private property to its natural uses." Just v. Marinette County,
supra at 17, 201 N.W.2d at 771.
For some commentators the economic result sanctioned in Just is viewed as meri
torious. As much appears, for example, in the argument of Bosselman, Callies, and
Banta that "regulation of land, if reasonably related to a valid public purpose [such
as environmental protection], can never constitute a taking." TAKING, supra note IO,
at 2�8. S�e UsE OF LAND, supra note 2,
at 1 75; Sax, Takings, Private Property and
Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 156 ( 1 971). Yet these authors caution that "we must
not let co ncern for the environment blind us to the fact that regulations have real
. .
economic impact on real people, and we must search for solutions that will take their
interests into account," TAKING, supra note IO, at 2, and that a proper construction
of the taking clause "must be politically feasible .. . , make sense economically, ...
and hold up in court." Id. at 318. How a construction of that clause which limits
the requirement of compensation to the sole instance of "actual appropriation of land
by �he government," id. at 254, is compatible with any of these · objectives, with the
possible, if problematic, exception of the last, is regrettably left unaddressed in the
authors' otherwise thoughtful and far-reaching examination of the taking issue.
16. See p. 1 07 infra.
17. A�on� Blackstone's better known, if somewhat cosmological, encomia to private
property is his statement that,
Th�re is nothin& which so generally strikes the imagination, a n d engages the af
fec�wns of mankmd, as the right to property; or that sole and despotic dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of t h e world, in total
.
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.
2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES •2.
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imbuing the American property system w i t h a distinctive bias in fa
vor of those deriving their wealth from land.18 But the pendulum has
started back. Courts 19 and commentators 2 0 are beginning to stress
the identity in principle of the expectations of land developers and
other types of entrepreneurs regarding economic return on their
resp ective investments.2 1
The fourth trend i s the gravitation of land use powers from local
governments to regional, state, and federal agencies. National land
use bills, 22 the proposed American Law Institute Model Land De
velopment Code, 2s the "sensitive area" l egislation of many of the
states,24 and the review of local land use decisions by regional agen
cies25 are illustrative.
Three consequences of this trend are pertinent. First, restrictive
police power measures that might not be sustained if evaluated with
in a purely local context are more easily defended if scrutinized in
terms of broader regional, state or national interests.26 Second, courts
1 8. See notes 90·94 infra.
1 9 . See, e.g., Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956,
961 (1st Cir. 1972); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 1 2, 201 N.W.2d 76 1 , 768 ( 1 972).
20. See, e.g., Johnston, Constitutionality of Su bdivision Exactions: The Quest for
a Rat ionale, 52 CORNELL L . Q. 871, 923 (1967); C u n n i n gham , Public Control of Land
Subdivision in Michigan: Description and Critique, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1, 25-33 ( 1 967).
2 1 . The land subdivider, Professor Johnston properly observes, is a:
manufac turer, processer , and marketer of a p r od u c t; land is bu t one of his raw
materials. In subdivision control disputes , the developer is not defen din g hearth and
home against the king's intrusion, but sim ply att em ptin g to maximize his profits
from the sale of a finished product. As applied to him , su bdivision control exactions
are actually business regulations.
Johnston, supra note 20, at 923.
22. See, e.g., S. 924, 93d Cong., l st Sess. ( 1 973) (Nixon bill); S. 268, 93d Cong..
1st Sess. ( 1973) (Jackson bill).
23. AL I MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CoDE (Tent. Drafts Nos. 2-5, 1970-73).
24. See, e.g Maryland Wetlands Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§ 718-30 (Supp. 1972);
Florida Environm ental Land and Wa ter Mana gem en t Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380
( 1 972); Vi rgin ia Wetlands Act, VA. CooE ANN. §§ 62.1 -13.2 to -13.9 (Supp. 197 3); cf.
ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE art. 7, pt. 2 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1 97 1 ) .
25. See, e.g., Massachusetts Regional Planning Law, MASS. Al\N. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20-23
.
(197 1 ) (review by state agency of local zoning decisions hindering the construction of
low-income housing).
26. Ex amples include measures imposing extraordinarily stringent controls upon the
development of lands in the San Francisco Bay area, the Hac kensack Meadowlands of
northern New J�·sey, and th e Lake Tah?e bi-st�te region. �ee CAL. Gov'r CODE �� 66600-61
.
(We s t Supp. 1 912). Demal of a permit to fill and btuld on a privately-owned tract
along the Bay was urnmccessfully c hall en ged in Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San
Francisco B�y C?nserv. &: Dev . co�rn·n . 11 c:;ai. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. R p tr. 897 ( 1 97 1 ).
.
.
.
of the leg1slat1on smce Its passage is reviewed in F . BossELMAN &:
The admm1strat1011
D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL 108-35 (Counc il on Env iron ·
mental Quality 197 1 ). See Hackensack Meadowland s Reclamation and Developmen t Act,
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 1 3. 1 7 - 1 to 13.17-86 (1968). The statute was upheld in Meadowlands
Regional Development Agency v . State, 112 N.J. Super. 89, 270 A.2d 4 1 8 ( 1 970), aff'd,
63 N.J. 35, 304 A.2d �45 ( 1 9J3). A two-year moratoriu m on selected development within
.
the Meado"'.lands D1stnct imposed under the s tatute and i m plementi n g regulations
was upheld m Meadowland Reg. Dev. Ag. v. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n, 1 1 9
N.J. Super. 572, 293 A.2d 1 92 (App. Div. 1972). See Tahoe Reg. Planning Compact, CAL.
.•
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are more likely to defer to agencies at higher levels of government
than to local governments, confident that the former have a better
grasp of the entire picture, are endowed with more qualified planning
staffs, and address land use concerns of overwhelming

social and

economic import for the area concerned.27 Finally, determining what
is a reasonable return on undeveloped land such as a tract in Florida's
Great Cypress Swamp28 or in the Hackensack Meadowlands29 will
be shaped in large measure by the regional agency's overall devel
opment plan a s well as by its capital improvements program. In a
community where development patterns are already largely fixed,
however, discrepancies between a return dictated by these expecta
tions and one severely reduced as a result of bold public interven
tion will be far more visible and hence more vulnerable to attack
as an uncompensated taking.
Finally local governments are experiencing growing sophistication
in planning matters. Today's planning arsenal includes such elab
orate techniques as timed development,30 flexible bulk and use regu
lation,31 design review,32 zoning bonuses,33 and a host of other in
novations.34 Goaded by federal35 and state planning assistance pro
grams,36 moreover, many local governments are now predicating their
§ 6680 1 (West Supp. 1972), which has been approved by Congress (Pub. L.
No. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360 (1969)). The statute \\"as sustairnid in People ex rel. Younger v.
County of El Dorado, 5 Cal. 3d 480, 487 P.2d 1 1 93, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1971).
27. See cases cited note 26 supra. See generally Heyman, Innovative Land Regulation
and Comprehensive Planning, in THE NEW ZONING: LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE AND ECONOMIC
CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 23 (N. Marcus & M . Groves eds. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
NEW ZONING] .
28. The development pressures threatening the Great Cypress Swamp are detailed in
Comment, Jetport: Planning and .Politics in the Big Cypress Swamp, 25 U. MIAMI L.
REV, 71 3 (1971).
29. See note 26 supra.
30. See, e.g., Golden v. Planning Board, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 29 1 , 334 N.Y.S.2d
138 ( 1972); Josephs v. Town Board, 24 Misc. 2<l 366, 198 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
31. See, e.g., Chrinko v. South Brunswick Twp. Planning Bd., 77 N.J. Super. 594,
187 A.2d 221 (L. Div. 1963) (flexible bulk regulation throu g h cluster zoning); Cheney
v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1 968) (flexible bulk and use
regulation through planned unit development zoning).
32. See NEW YORK, N.Y. ZONING RESOLUTION art. VII, ch. 4, § 74-792(5) (1971) (au
thorizing design review of the compatibility of proposed construction with designated
New York City l andmark buildings).
33. A zoning bonus is an additional increment of density that the municipality
aw�rds to th � developer as a quid pro quo for the inclusion in his project of a pre
scnbed amemty, such as a plaza or an arcade. In theory, the amount of the density
increment should equal or slightly exceed in value the cost of the amenity. See J.
CosTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT: LANDMARK PRESERVATION AND THE MARKETPLACE 30-32 (forth
coming 1974) [hereinafter cited as SPACE ADRIFT ] .
34. See generally NEW ZONING, supra note 27, passim; Elliott & Marcus, From ,Euclid
to Ramapo: New Directions in Land Development Control, I HOFSTRA L. REV. 56 (1973).
35. Federal planning assistance programs are summarized hr D. HAGMAN, PUBLIC
PLANNING AND CONTROL OF URBAN AND LAND DEVELOPMENT .17-58, 62-71, 73-75 (1973).
36. See, e.g., C ONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-201 et seq. (1970); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127,
§ 63bl4-14.18 (1971).
Gov'T CODE
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land use decisions upon thorough planning studies whose conclusions
are express components of duly enacted comprehensive plans.
Given these developments,

stringent land use measures are

less

easily attacked on taking grounds for two reasons. First, i nstead of
imposing restrictions

ou tright,

local

visible but equally onerous routes.

governments

proceed

by

less

Astute communities no longer

flatly proscribe unwanted development.

Rather, they make

it

the

subject of involved special exception procedures, reviewing it on a
case by case basis a n d approving it, i f a t all, pursuant to discre
tionary criteria and detailed conditions.37 Second, once the courts are
persuaded that a challenged measure is the product of thoughtful
planning inquiries, they are less likely to quibble with its economic
consequences.as
The apparent weakening of the compensation requiremen t does not
mean, however, that the land use dilemma. is nearing satisfactory reso
l ution. Many land u s e conflicts will remai n troublesome because of
their distinctly local c haracter, as in t h e case of the Tudor Parks con
troversy, or because of the visibly disproportionate burdens that their
resolution under the police power threatens to foist off on a tiny
class of landowners, as i l lustrated by the Stock Exchange conflict.39
Furthermore the current or continu ing influence of the five trends
s ketched above cannot be confidently predicted for any given state.
Each is controversial and a certain target of continuing litigation by
developers and landowners, who can be e xpected to invoke ample
precedents that clash w ith the ambitious concept of the police power
that these trends signal.
In any event the question would remain even if the whittling
away of the compensation requirement gained widespread legal sup
port. Although deemed constitutional, this solution might not be fair
or politic, for the issue is not whether resource protection is meri
torious but who should pay for it. Denyi n g greater density to the
l andowner in the foregoing examples makes him the u nwilling fi37. See Golden v. Planning Board, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 285 N.E.2d 291
(1972). These procedural and regulatory refinements abound in the cases cited note
10 supra.
38. Professor Heyman persuasively argues that the taking objection often serves as
c�nvenient cover inv ?ked by cou�·ts to invalidate a measure because it is the product
.
.
of ill-conceived planning. Innovative Land Regulation and Comprehensive Planning,
i n NEW ZONING, supra note 27, at 26-32. 64-65.
39. An analysis of the decrease in value that would be sustained if four Chicago
School of Architecture buildings were permanently designated as landmarks revealed
an average drop in the fair market value of these properties of 52.l percent or, stated
in dollar terms, an aggregate loss of $8,732,000. See SPACE ADRIFT, suf>ra note 33, at
76, table 6. Greater relative losses can be anticipated when no income-producing im
provements are permitted on the restricted resource site.
a
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nanc1er of a resource that the community desires. In addition, the
land of other p roperty owners, unaffected by the stringent controls,
may become more valuable,40 a result aptly described by Professor
Hagman as the "windfall/ wipe-out" phenomenon.41 Public measures
that create windfalls for some by gouging others surely ought to be
avoided if possible, whatever their constitutional status.42
Political realities must also be t aken into account since the im
plementation of action programs, not the vindication of a n abstract
constitutional p rinciple, is ultimately at stake. The views of com
mentators for whom the compensation requirement is outmoded not
withstanding, 43 implementing action p rograms will be difficult, if not
impossible, without strong governmental commitment

and the co

operation or acquiescence of affected private groups. Noncompensa
tory measures that severely reduce economic return on private prop
erty are unlikely candidates on both counts. Few public officials and
administrators are eager to back controversial programs that threaten
to antagonize potent interest groups. It is certain that real estate and
other potentially burdened interests will attempt to block such meas
ures. One need look no further than the increasing signs of an en
vironmental b acklash, abetted by the nation's ravenous energy de
mands,44 for the stormclouds that lie ahead.
40. This result is known among land economists as the problem of "shifting value."
As described b y Turvey:
Where land is withdrawn from the area available for building, the value of the
prospect of building increment on the remaining land is increased by the actual
value of the prospect thus extinguished on the withdrawn land.
Turvey, Development Charges and the Compensation-Betterment Problem, 63 ECON.
·

J. 299, 300 (1953).
41. See F. BossELMAN & D. CALLIES, supra note 26, at 24-27; D. HAGMAN, supra note 35,
at 550 n.k. A glaring example exists in Hawaii where harsh restrictions upon develop

ment in that state's "conservation zones" have caused substantial increases in the value
of private lands located in "urban zones," districts in which higher densities are per
mitted as a matter of right. In July 1973, Professor Hagman received a com
prehensive planning and research demonstration grant (Project No. California PD- 1 3)
from the U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development for a study entitled "Wind
falls and Wipeouts: The Quiet Undoing of Land-Use Controls." The study will identif y
and appraise the extent to which a variety of land use and public finance techniques,
including development rights transfer, are likely to distribute the burdens and benefits
of public land use regulation more equitably than occurs under existing practice.
42. For a thoughtful analysis of the link between the Fifth Amendment and the
"windfall/wipeout" phenomenon, see Wexler, Betterment Recovery: A Finan cial Pro
posal for Sounder Land Use Planning, 3 YALE REV. OF L. & Soc. ACTION 192, 200-04 (1973).
43. See authorities cited note 15 supra.
44. The "energy crisis" has alread y made serious inroads in the environmental gains
of recent years. President Nixon has urged the states and cities to relax their air
pollution regulations to allow the burning of high-sulfur fuel to avert "a very serious"
shortage of heating fuel in 1973-74. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1973, § l, at 1, col. 8. In
August 1973, the House and Senate in different forms approved the Trans-Alaskan
Pipeline Authorization Act which will expedite construction of the p ipe l ine by, inter
alia, declaring that the Secretary of the U.S. Dep't of Interio r has complied with
pertinent requirements of federal environmental legislation and by substantially im
munizing the building of the pipeline from further judicial challenge. See 119 Cong.
Rec. 7216-7309 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1973).
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It cannot be doubted that the American property system has erred
i n treating land as a commodity for trade, virtually ignoring its status
as a community resource. But it is far from clear that a precipitous
jump to the emasculation of the compensation requirement is the
proper way to remedy the environmental degradation traceable in
part to the system's bias favoring private property rights.
That requirement, as interpreted in this century, buttresses two
social functions of property that are perilous to ignore. The first is
property's role as guarantor of individual liberties, a role affirmed
i n the Magna Carta) by Coke and Blackstone, 45 and by contemporary
commentators, such as Charles Reich .46 Concededly, courts have con
strued this function overbroadly in sheltering land entrepreneurs
from public regulation. But that concession hardly establishes that
the latter should be totally deprived of the safeguards afforded by
the compensation requirement in instances other than actual physical
appropriation. And i t is simply wrong to assume that environmental
m easures will burden fat cat developers while leaving untouched pri
vate citizens generally, the class most in need of these safeguards.
The concern for individual liberties should not be dismissed as a
star-spangled cloak for anti-environmental behavior. A recent report
of the Task Force on Land Use and Urban Growth adverts repeatedly
to instances of the "visceral . . . 'damned-if-we-want-urbanization'
response"47 parading u nder the environmental banner48 and cautions
that the new mood "encompasses a range of negative attitudes that
are sometimes confused and even hostile to the needs of our society
for new development."49
The institution of private property also provides the framework of
i ncentives in response to which land development occurs in the
American economy. A blunderbuss assault on the compensation re
q uirement will inevitably weaken that framework, hindering rational
decisions respecting commerce in land. Land is neither wholly a so
cial resource nor a commodity for trade. Its hybrid character war
rants continued, if somewhat modified, recognition of the entitlement
of land entrepreneurs to the security of transactions that the American
economic system affords to merchants generally. Despite the advo45. For an account of the evolution of this notion from its origins in the Magna
Carta to the writings of Coke and Blackstone, see TAKING, supra note IO, at 53-60' 75-81
'

88-92, 100-02.
46. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964).
47. UsE OF LAND, supra note 2, at 60 (quoting an observer's reaction to a population
limitation referendum in Boulder City, Colorado).
48. See id. at 33, 42, 52-61, 89-94, 100-01.
49. Id. at 17.
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cacy of "no-growth" policies from various quarters, 50 moreover, it is
certain, as the Task Force on Land Use and Urban Growth docu
ments, that "grow we will."51 In light of land's hybrid character and
of the certainty of further growth, it would be tragic to dissipate the
opportunities created by America's "new mood" toward its environ
ment by seeking to clamp restraints on the property system that are
inequitable and probably unworkable. Instead, these opportunities
should be seized to refashion the property system to accommodate
the nation's environmental needs with a redefined conception of the
legitimate economic expectations of those deriving their wealth from
land.
One technique for achieving this accommodation is development
rights transfer. It stands squarely upon a principle which has been
implicit in American land use practice since the Euclid decision: The
development potential of privately-held land is in part a community
asset that government may allocate t o enhance the general welfare.
This article is divided into three sections. The first sets forth two
applications of the development rights transfer technique and dis
cusses its advantages over conventional resource protection approaches.
The second section explores the legal difficulties inherent in view
ing private property as partially a community asset. The final sec
tion identifies subsidiary issues in the economics and planning realms
that are likely to arise when resource protection programs employing
the transfer technique are implemented.

I.

Development Rights Transfer: The Concept and Its Operation
The basic cause of the land use conflicts described above is the

destruction of the development potential and hence market value of
affected sites o r areas. The same site cannot support a landmark and
a modern office tower, or a nature preserve and a polluting industrial
plant. By assuming that the development potential of a site may be
used only on that site, the property system makes an either /or choice
inevitable:

the landmark or the tower, the nature preserve or the

plant. Depending upon the choice, constitutional challenge or amen
ity loss is the predictable outcome.
Development rights transfer breaks the linkage between particu
lar land and its development potential by permitting the transfer of
that potential, or "development rights," to land where greater density
50.
51.

Id. at
Id. at

50-53.
75.
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will not be obj ection a ble.52 In freeing the bottled-up development
rights for use elsewhere, the technique a v oids the either /or dilemma
because it both protects the threatened resource and enables
owner

of the

restricted

site

to

recoup

t he

economic

value

the
rep

resented by the site's frozen potential. T h e mechanics of this flexible
approach are set forth in two contexts b e l ow.

Landmark Preservation: The Chicago Plan

A.

One proposal, the Chicago Plan,53 i llustrates how the transfer tech
n i que may be employed to preserve u rban landmarks. The city would
begin by designating a "developmen t rights transfer district," an area
within which the u nu sed developme n t righ ts of landmark sites could
be transferred.54 T h e boundaries of this d i s trict would be drawn to
i nclude the area of the city in which m o s t of i ts downtown land
marks are concentrated. The purposes of this boundary requirement
are threefold: first, the area would probably offer the most lucra tive
market for these rights because land val ues are likely to be high ;
second, the low density landmarks would offset to some extent the
i ncreased density permitted on transferee s i tes by serving as l ight and
a i r parks sprinkled throughout the area ; a nd th ird, the area would
ordinarily contain a h igh concentration o f the city's public services
a n d facilities, enabl i n g i t to handle the

redistributed density and

concomitant population with greater efficiency than other sections
o f the city.
Upon the designation of a building as a landmark its owner would
be entitled to sell i ts u nused developmen t rights to owners of non
l andmark sites w i thin the transfer district. In addition, the landmark
owner would enjoy a healthy reduction in his real estate tax bill
because his site, shorn of its former rights, would drop sharply in
value. He would be a llowed to transfer t h e rights to one or more
s ites, but increased b u l k on individual

transferee sites

would

be

held to rigorous ceilings to prevent esthetic blight by buildings that
dwarf their neighbors. The landmark owner would then be obligated
52. The literature on 'development rights transfer is sparse, the principal st udies
including SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 33; Costonis, The Ch i ca g o Plan: Incentive Zo11i11 g
a�d the Pr�servatio11 of Urban La � dma!·ks, 85 HARV. L . REV. 574 (19i2) [herein after
cited as Chicago P lan ] ; Marcus, Air Rights Transfers in New York Cit-v, 36 LAW &
CoNTEMP. PROB. 372 (197 1 ) ; Note, Development Rights Tra 11sfei- i11 New York City, 82
YALE L.J. 338 (1 972). The transfer technique, as applied in New York City, is further
described in Elliott & M a rc u s supra note 34, at 72-78.
5 3 . See Chicago Plan, supra note 52. The simplified description that follows in text
of the Chicago Plan, as originally devised by the au thor, is drawn from this article.
54 . . The amount of transf�rabl� rights for any given landmark site is measured by
t�e difference betwee '?- t h e mtenor square footage allowed for a building on that
site under present zoning and the square footage that the landmark actually contains .
,
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to maintain the building in accordance with sound b uilding man
agement practices.
A dual bulk system would regulate densities on nonlandmark sites
within the transfer district. Landowners who declined to purchase
developme n t rights would be governed by the lower ceilings of the
bulk district, the "residual zone," within which their land was lo
cated when

the transfer district was established. Purchasers of de

velopment rights, on the other hand, would enjoy additional density
in amounts proportional to their p urchases ; increases i n the value
of their land attributable to the extra density would determine the
price that they would pay for these rights.
If a landmark owner rejected the transfer option a nd insisted in
stead upon a cash award or the right to redevelop h i s site, the city
would be empowered to obtain a preservation restriction by pur
chasing or c ondemning the as-ye t unused rights. Acquisition costs
and other expenses of this program would be funded through a "de
velopment rights bank." The bank would serve as a pool for the
development rights acquired from recalcitrant owners a s well as those
donated by owners of other landmarks or transferred from publicly
owned landmarks. The city would finance program costs out of a
revolving fund created by selling

these pooled rights,

subject to

the same urban design controls that apply to private owners. The
bank's start-u p funds would derive, in most cases, from sale of the
development rights of one or more publicly owned

landmarks.

With the transfer of its development rights elsewhere,
mark property loses its speculative · appeal. Because

the land

i t remains in

private hands, the city avoids outlays for fee acquisition, restoration,
and maintenance and can continue to tax it but a t a lesser rate.
The reduced tax yield of the landmark property, however, will be
largely offset by the increased taxes paid by owners o f the more
profitable buildings that go up o n transferee sites.
B.

Environ mental Protection: A Proposal for the
Phosph orescent Bay

I.

From Landmarks to Nature Preserves
Subseque n t

empirical investigation of the Chicago

Plan's feasi

bility55 has suggested two refinements which merit review because
55. In June 1 972, the U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development awarded an
urban demonstration grant to the National Trust for Historic Preservation to examine
the legal, economic, and planning feasibility o f the Chicago Plan, using the threatened

Chicago School of Architecture landmarks i n Chicago's Loop as the principal, though
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they form a bridge between the applica tion of development rights
transfer in the specialized context of urban l andmark preservation
a n d its more ambitious use for environm e n ta l goals. They a lso call
a ttention to the need for a fundamental shift in the rationale su p 
porting the technique and require a consideration of the thesis that
the developmen t potential of private lan d ought to be regarded in
part as a public resource.
The recommendation that transfer districts be coextensive

with

areas of landmark concentration is the s u bject of the first refinement.
In some cities districting on this basis cou ld prove unduly restric
tive. These areas may already be congested due to poor plann ing or
successfu l

lobbying by real estate interests for excessive bulk al
6
lowances. 5 The recommendation cou l d compound faulty urban de
sign i n these cases even though the Plan calls only for the redis

tri bu tion of presently au thorized bulk, n o t for the crea tion of further
density.57 The recommendation also may not be workable in cities
whose lan dmarks are widely sca ttered. E i ther the entire city must
become a transfer district, a suggestion fraught with distressing plan
n i ng complications, or only a portion of i t, i n which case landmarks
o u tside the district w i l l not be protected. Furthermore, the recom·
mendation could prevent a city from u ti lizing other opportun ities

not exclusive, focus of the inquiry. The author served as project director of this study,
the economic inquiry being conducted by Real Estate Research Corporation of Chicago,
Illinois, and the urban design investigation by the Okamoto Associates of San Francisco,
California. The results of this study, which are recounted i n Space Adrift, were not
available when the Chicago Plan was initially worked out . Instead, an earlier rudimentary
empirical study coauthored by the author with Jared Shlaes, a Chicago realtor, was
used. See Development Rights Transfer: A Solution to Chicago's Landmarks Dilemma
(Chicago Chapter Foundation of the American Institute of Architects & National Trust
for Historic Preservation, May 13, 1971).
56. The use of development rights transfer to preserve landmarks i n New York
City, see NEW YoRK, N.Y. ZONING RESOLUTION art. VIII, ch. 4, §§ 74-79, 74-791 to .793
( 1 �7 1), has been shari;i ly criticized on this ground. See Note, supra note 52, at 3 5 1 -:'1 3;
Dissent fro � Resolut10n CP-� l l 66 of the N e w York City Planning Comm'n t o the
Board of Est1 �ate, May 1 3 , 1 9 ; 0 (c ?mments of Planning Board member Spatt on a mend
ment expandmg use of the techmque). These criticisms are manifestations of a more
f ':1n�amental eroblem-the pred� minant �nfluence of the real estate community i n
.
.
.
nggmg mumc1pa� spatial allocat10n pohc1es t o serve i t s special interests. F o r a case
study demonstratmg that bulk zoning in Chicago's central business district is little
more than a developer's bonanza, see SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 33, at 80-86, 9 5 - 1 04.
See generally E . HIGBEE, THE SQUEEZE: CITIES WITHOUT SPACE ( 1 960); s. TOLL, ZONED
AMERICAN (1969).
57. �his distinction can be i�lustrated by comparing zoning bonuses with develop
�ent rights transfe�s. In affordmg the dev�loper a "bonus" of additional density in
ietu�n f<;>r an amemty such as a plaz� furmshed a t the developer's expense, the com
.
.
mumty mcreases the amou� t of density. m the residual
zone by the amount of the
bonus space. But �o such mcrease occurs when a developmen t rights purchaser
con
.
structs a l�rger b m ldmg because the augment ed bulk of his building
is offset by a
_
C?rrespondmg decrease m the bulk permitted on the. landmark site from
which the
nghts are transferred. See notes 33 supra, 203 infra. See· generally Chicago
Plan supra
note 52, at 575-78, 594-96.
·
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that the transfer technique offers for improved urban design includ
ing, for example, dispersal or concentration of selected land uses,
establishment of high rise elements at defined locations, and opti
mization of transit system use. 58 I f the areas within which additional
density is desirable were some distance from the city's landmarks,
the Plan's subsidiary urban design advantages could not be realized.
Cities may therefore consider the alternative of mapping transfer
districts independently of areas o f landmark concentration.59
The second refinement relates to the consequences of the Plan's
adoption for existing density levels within areas that are selected
as transfer districts. Under the dual bulk system described earlier,
the density prescribed for nonlandmark sites either remains un
changed or, if their owners purchase development rights, actually
increases. D ensity would not be deliberately skewed downward,
whether to create a market for the rights or to overcome urban
design complications that may result from density transfers. The
dual bulk system is thus essentially an instance of density zoning,
which prescribes a maximum amount of bulk for an area as a whole
and permits developers to concentrate or disperse that density on
individual lots within the area in accordance with flexible site plan
ning criteria.60 Under this conception the total density for the entire
transfer district is fixed by the bulk regulations of the residual zones
included within the district's boundaries. Analogous to clustered
subdivisions6 1 or planned unit developments (PUD's)62-also examples
of density zoning-the Plan treats the overall district as a single tract,
permitting the potential density of transferee sites to increase as that
of landmark sites decreases.
Pragmatic considerations dictated the decision to base the Chicago
Plan on the density zoning rationale. Politically, the Plan's chances
for adoption would plummet if it called for reduction of existing
densities in the city's prime development area. America's cities are
58. See SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 33, at 50, 1 36.
59. Id. at 50, 5 1 .
60. See Chicago Plan 620-28. Traditional bulk zoning, on the other hand, allocates
density on a lot by lot basis and does not permit the maximum density ·on any lot
within a bulk district to exceed that of any other lot there.
61. Cluster zoning ordinances offer the developer a trade: if he agrees to devote
a prescribed percentage of his subdivision tract to a com!Jltmity use, such as a park
or schoolground, he is authorized in return to build the same number of residential
units on the remaining portion of this tract that he formerly could have built on
the tract as a whole. See URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, NEW APPROACHES TO RESIDENTIAL LAND
DEVELOPMENT (Tech. Bull. No. 40, 1961); w. WHYTE, CLUSTER DEVELOPMENT (1964).
62. In addition to offering the same flexibility regarding density allocation as cluster
ordinances, PUD zoning ordinances relax building type and use restrictions. See Goldston
& Scheuer, Zoning of Planned Residential Developments, 73 HARV . L. REV. 241 (1959);
Sy mposium, Planned Unit Development, 1 14 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1965).
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addicted to chronic growth fantasiesG3 a n d m u nicipal politicians are
loath to take on the banks, chambers of commerce, and other boosters
of bigness in their cities.64 Given

the relatively small number 0£

landmarks and hence limited amount of density to be transferred in
any city, moreover, neither the Plan's marketing nor its urban de
sign requirements

are

likely

to

demand

recourse

to

this

contro

versial approach.
From a legal perspective there seemed even less reason to embrace
deliberate downzoning. Density zoning has been firmly endorsed by
the courts since its inception two decades ago,65 but they have not
spoken to the legitimacy of deliberately downzoning or its equivalent,
refusing to upzone a n area,66 in order to buttress the market for
development rights or to avoid the urban design complications.

Ju

dicial approval of these practices would be tantamount to endorse
ment of the principle that

the

developmen t potential

of private

property is in part a community resource. While the principle merits
j udicial approval, the density zoning rationale offered a less risky,
though fully adequate, foundation for the original version of the Plan.
It is impossible to sidestep this problem, h owever, if transfer dis
tricts are mapped i n dependently of areas of landmark concentration.
Consider, for example, a proposal that t h e residents of the H istoric
Georgetown District i n Washington, D.C., advanced to facilitate res
toration of the waterfront bordering the District.G7 They were dis
tressed with the d eterioration of the wa terfron t into an industrial
slum and with a zon ing ordinance w h i c h permitted large bui ldings
that would destroy the District's dimensional scale. Furthermore, the
construction of Washington's new Metro subway system had created
pressures for removal

of

the ten-story

height limit

that Congress

imposed on the city i n 19 10 to insure that the Capitol dominates
63. Chicago's recently proposed comprehensive plan has been described as a "super
plan." Chicago Sun Times, June 15, 1973, at 4, col. 1 .
64. See note 56 supra.
65. See Chicago Plan, supra note 52, at 623-25; notes 1 89-90 infra.
66. Because changin g t�e status quo is u su a ll y more productive of troublesome l ega l
.
consequences than leavm� It unchanged, the suggested equivalence of a deliberate down
zoning of existing ?ensities and a deliberate refusal to u pzone them may appear
anomalous . 1'.he sub3ect of l c:gal challenge , howeve�, wou Id not be these act io ns per sc,
.
.
b u t the leg1t1macy of the ob3ect1ves that they are m tended to serve. As the discussions
of t�e Chicago P lan, p . 86 supra, and of t�e Geo:getown proposal , text accom·
_
panymg note . 67 mfrn, make clear, the respecu �e act10ns fulfill identical objectives,
namely , �reauon of . a market for development nghts and avoidance of urban design
.
�om.phcations re�ultmg from density transfers. Hence, a determination that these ob1ect1ves fall outside the scope ?£ the zoning or, more largely, the police power would
seem as fatal when a community refuses to upzone as when it deliberately downzones
for this purpose.
67. See Von Eckardt, Getting Charm and Height, Wash. Post, Feb. 27, 1 9 7 1 , § C, at
1, col. 5; Chicago Plan, supra note 52, at 596 n.74.
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the skyline. Accordingly, the Georgetowners urged that presently un
used development rights along the waterfront be transferred for use
downtown i n h igh density development adjoining the M e tro route.
This strategy would provide funds for waterfront restoration, pre
vent high den s i ty development there, avoid urban design problems
that could arise if this density were transferred to other sections of
predominantly low density Georgetown, and encourage efficient transit
system use by channeling additional density along the M etro route.
But this plan also anticipates that densities permitted as of right
along the Metro would be set at levels lower than those that would
have been fixed if no rights were t o be transferred there. Otherwise,
developers might have no incentive t o purchase the tra n sferred rights.
Nor would the low density ameni ty-the restored waterfront-be lo
cated within the area of redistribut ed density. The balance of high
density for low that occurs when transfer districts overlap areas of
landmark concentration would therefore be sacrificed.
Adapting the transfer technique to the larger task of environmental
protection will require that transfer d istricts be located outside of
environmentally sensitive areas and that densities permitted as of
right in the districts be deliberately skewed downward. Both features
appear in the following transfer proposal which takes as

its focal

point Puerto Rico's embattled Phosphorescent Bay.
2.

Salvation for the Dino/lagellates
In common with other ecologically fragile areas, the

escent Bay faces the spectre of grave harm through

Phosphor

high density

development. Highway construction and other capital improvements
have rendered i ts formerly remote location accessible a n d the pros
pect of additional jobs for the island's underemployed work force
makes commercial

development a ttractive to its political

Soaring land values, moreover, have

made the cost of

leaders.

public ac

quisition of the Bay lands prohibitive and rock bottom real estate
taxes encourage owners of these

lands to hold their property off

the market in anticipation of windfall profits. The Bay, i n short,
epitomizes the threatened environmental resource whose plight can
not be remedied by recourse to conventional land u s e controls or
public financing techniques.
Development rights transfer may substantially alleviate the threat
which economic forces pose to the Bay. The proposal s e t forth here
has been conceived without the benefit of planning a n d economic
studies such as those used in formulating and refining the Chicago
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Plan6s and is therefore tentative. 69 At a m m 1 mum, however, it serves
as a useful point of departure for subsequent discussion of the legal,
planning, and economic issues that must be confronted in employing
the transfer techn ique for environmental protection.
The proposal proceeds from two givens :

the general pattern of

development i n Pu erto Rico and the existing regulatory powers of
the Puerto Rico

Planning Board.

Crudely defined,

Puerto

Rico's

land mass comprehends three types of areas : urban, nonurban, and
transitional. The

principal urban

areas

are

the

coastal cities con

taining most of the population and industry. Nonurban sections in 
clude the rugged i n terior and the coastal sections lying between the
built-up areas w h ere most of the island's environmentally sensitive
locations are found. Transitional areas surround the cities and are
imminent targets for residential and commercial development.
Although largely the brainchild of R exford Tugwell some thirty
years ago, the Puerto Rico Planning Board70 was given powers ·which
anticipate remarkably well the trend toward a more influential plan
n ing role for regional and state agencies. The board, for example, ex
ercises its powers throughout the island, not simply within unincor
porated areas.71 Moreover, it zones only the land within urban areas ;72
development in other areas is subject to case by case approval.73 In
addition, the board must prepare an island-wide comprehensive plan,74
which may address the subject of natural resource protection75 as well
as other land use and social welfare concerns of the island.
68. See note 55 supra.
69. In early 1973, the author and Real Estate Research Corporation received an
invitation from Francisco J. Blanco, executive director of the Conservation Trust of
Puerto Rico to investigate the possibility of employing development rights transfer to pro
tect Puerto Rico's dwindling environmental resources. The background ·information con
cerning Puerto Rico is largely derived from preliminary interviews conducted by the
author and Robert S. DeVoy, senior vice-president, Real Estate Research Corporation,
with Puerto Rican governmental officials, lenders, developers, and realtors, and fro m the
publication, Puerto Rico Planning Board, Land Use Policies: A Draft for Discussion
(1970). The author gratefully acknowledges Messrs. DeVoy and Bianco's many useful com
ments on the Puerto Rico proposal.
70. See Puerto Rico Planning and Budget Act, P .R. LAws ANN. tit. 23, �� 1 -225
(Supp. 1 972). For regulations implementing the Act, see RULES A�D REGULATioNs or
P UERTO RICO tit. 23, §§i 1 -225 ( 1 973).
7 1 . See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 23, § 6a (Supp. 1 972).
72 see id. § 9(1). Z?oi � g regulations may also be applied to lands outside of u rban
areas when such apphcat10n serves to control urban development by preserving [these
lands] for agricultural purposes." Id.
73. See id. §§ 9(3), 25; RULES AND REGULATIONS OF PUERTO Rico tit. 23 §§ 1 0 - 1 to -4 1
5
( 1 973 ).
74. See P_.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 23, §§ 6a(2), 9 (Supp. 1 972).
75. See 1�. § 6a(2). The Board _ is also authorized to employ its zoning power to
preserve agricultural land and provide greenbelts around u rban areas and along high·
ways. See id._ § 9(1). W?ether these sections would permit the Board to create the
Planned. � nv1ronmental Zon es re ferred to subsequently in text is not clear. Cf. Land
_
Use Pohc1es: A . � raft f� r D .1scuss10n,
supra note 69, at 69 (questioning authority of the
_
Board under ex1stmg leg1slat1on
to create "conservation districts").
·

.

..

'
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The Phosphorescent Bay and the island's other environmentally
sensitive resources could be safeguarded in the following manner.
First, the planning board would prepare an inventory of the island's
known environmentally sensitive areas, much as the m u n icipal land
marks commission inventories landmarks under the Chicago Plan.
Second, the board would designate these areas as Protective Environ
mental Zones

(PEZ's) and prescri b e criteria and related procedures

for designating other areas in the future. Development within a PEZ
that threatens the protected resource would be flatly prohibited. Other
forms of development, however, would be permitted if they comport
with applicable

planning criteria

of a

nonenvironmental

nature.

Regulating the PEZ in this man n e r would assure protection of the
resource and would minimize governmental interference with pri
vate ownership. Permitting a broad range of alternative uses short
of those threatening environmental

harm, moreover,

would avoid

effective challenge to the PEZ designation as a taking i n many cases,
and it would reduce the amoun t o f the condemnation award that
might be constitutionally or statutorily required in others.76
Third, property owners within a PEZ would be permitted to chal
lenge the P E Z designation and regulations before t h e board. 77 The
designation · an d regulations would remain unchanged if the board
concluded that they were not constitu tionally objectionable or, in
the alternati ve, that they permitted a return in excess of the minimum
prescribed by statute. If it found the designation or regulations de
fective, the board could opt to compensate the owners, measuring
the award either by the difference between the highest return that
is possible under the uses permitted in the PEZ and the minimum
return that is required to satisfy constitutional requirements, or by
the difference between actual return and that fixed b y statute. The
board could also cure the constitutional objection by a ppropriately

76. See pp. 1 22-23 infra.
77. For examples of comparable proced u res under existing law, see New York City
Landmarks Ordinance, NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CooE ANN. ch. 8-A, �§ 207 - 1 .0q, 207-8.0
(1971); Massachusetts Wetlands Law, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1 30, § 105 (Supp.
1971). The New York ordinance enables an owner of a designated landmark building.
to compel either the lifting of formal landmark status-and its attendant restrictions on
the building's alteration or demolition-or public acquisition of the bui lding if he
demonstrates through administrative proceedings that the landmark property is unable
to earn a reasonable return. The Massachusetts statute similarly empowers the owner
of land wi�hin a designated wetlands area to secure either compensation or Jemoval
of the wetlands designation and related use restrictions if the latter are deemed con
fiscatory. The owner, however, must seek relief before a court, not an administrative
agency. For an account of the statute and its administration, see F. BossELMAN & D.
CALLIES, supra note 26, at 205·16.
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liberalizing the restrictions.78 Decisions of t h e board would, o f co urse,
be subject to judicial review.

Finally, the board would fund compensa tion awards t hrough sale
of the claimant's otherwise frozen developme n t potential for use in
transfer districts located elsewhere

on

these

island. Although

the

districts would serve the same marketing function as those cal led
for under the Chicago Plan, they would differ in four key respects.

First, they would n o t be located in a s ingle city or in one, . of i ts
sections; rather, they would be found throughout the island, prin

cipally in transitional areas but possibly in selected urban areas as
well.79 Second, because of this locational · difference, the medium of

transfer would not be floor area as u nder the Chicago Plan, but
some other form of liberalized development control proportioned in
dollar value to the frozen potential of the restricted parcel. Using
floor area as the medium of exchange would not be feasible i n Puerto
Rico because transfers are more likely to occur between dissimilar

districts, such as rai n forests and residen tial zones.
Third, the tw o refinements to the original version of the Chicago
P lan-mapping transfer districts independently of the protected re
source and skewing downwards the residual densities with i n tra nsfer
districts-would probably be employed rou tinely in Puerto Rico. The
risk that high

density

poses for ecologically

fragile

resources

will

often require that it b e removed from PEZ's al together. Density zon
ing, under which b u l k is redistribu ted on a physically contiguous
land area, may not be feasible when transfer districts are located far
from the protected resource. These di fferences can be illustrated by
comparing the transfer of density from Bay lands to

a

residential

subdivision forty miles away with the transfer of 60,000 square feet
of floor area (approximately two stories) from a landmark in a cen
tral business district to a site two blocks away. If residual densities
within the subdivision already equal

the maximum

that

the pre

vailing market for n e w construction wou ld absorb and that substan
tive planning criteria j ustify, the transferred densi ty would not only
be unsalable but, if used within the subdivision, could cause con
gestion and poor design
78.

results as well.

A similar approach is advocated in Bosselman,

Nei ther problem

would

The Th ird A lternative in Zo11i1ia

�

1\101.)EL LAND DEVELOPMENT Coo
art. 9 - 1 1 1 (3) (Tent. Draft No. 3 ( 1 97 1 )) .
79. Sect ions o f P uerto Rico's cities are un<ler<l�v � lopc<l, causing inefficient usage o f
,
,
the island
s small land mass. See Land U s e Pohc1�s : A Draft for Discussion, supra
.
no te 69, at 48-5 1 . Targetmg these areas as transfer d1stncts and encouraging their rede
.
.
velopment to more appropnale density levels would produce more efficient urban de
velopment patterns.

Litigation, 17 ZONING DIGEST 1 1 3, 1 1 6 - 1 7 ( 1 965); ALI

.

94

Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay

arise under the Chicago Plan because the additional two stories of
the landmark site would merely be added to a nearby site zoned,
perhaps, for forty stories and surrou nded by predominantly high-rise
construction. 80
Finally, a uthority to transfer density would be vested solely in the
planning board rather than shared with property owners in PEZ's.
By allowing transfers to major development areas throughout the is
land, the P u erto Rico program enhances the probability that devel
opment rights transfer can produce beneficial plann ing results in
addition to providing resource protection. It has been observed, for
example, that key areas of certain Puerto Rican c ities are under
built, contrary to the island's preference for compact rather than
sprawling development. 81 Enabling the planning board,

in

its dis

cretion, to transfer density to these areas would resolve this problem
with greater certainty than if private owners also enj oyed the trans
fer option.

Bookkeeping under t h e Puerto Rican

program, more

over, would be complicated by t h e wider geographical scope of the
transfers and by the nonhomogeneity of the types o f development
occurring on transferor and transferee sites. Exclusive planning board
administration of density transfers would seem the more advisable
course for dealing with these complications as well.
C.

Development Rights Transfer: A Positive Prospectus
The role development rights transfer will play as a land use and

public financing technique i n corning years is not easily assayed. Con
ceptually, the device is in its infancy. It has not as yet received the
imprimatur of the courts.82 Despi te the favorable conclusions of a
feasibility study addressing its u s e for landmark preservation83 and

80. For a p rojection of the urban design consequences of density transfers within
high-density commercial and residential zones, see SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 33, at ch. 5.
8 1 . See note 79 supra.
82. Court challenges involving two New York City development rights transfer programs may soon shed some light on judicial attitudes toward the technique. In the
first action the Penn Central Company, as owner of Grand Central Station, a desig
nated landmark, has attacked the constit u tionality of the New York City Landmarks
program , which includes provisions expressly tailored to relieve economic pressures
threatening the landmark by permitting the transfer of its unused development rights to
nearby lots. See NEW YORK , N.Y. ZONING RESOLUTION art. VII, ch. 4 , §§ 74-79, 74-791
to -793 (197 1 ) . An account of the litigation may be found in UsE OF LAND, supra note 2 ,
at 150-52. An action has also been commenced challenging the constitu tionality of a
second measure, N EW YORK, N.Y. ZONING RESOLUTION . art. IX, ch. 3, §§ 93-00, 93-01 to
-075 (1 972), which offsets the prohibition o f development of Manhattan's Tudor Parks
by permitting the transfer of their development rights to other lots within a "Special
Park District." The measure is further described in Elliott 8c Marcus, supra note 34,
at 76-78.
83. See note 55 supra.
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some conspicuous successes in a variety of limited contexts,8 4 i t cannot
lay claim to extensive testing in the marketpl ace. A variety of stubborn
Plannincr and economic questions remai n unresolve d. Despite these
0

uncertainties it may not be premature

.

to catalogue the maJor ad-

vantages of development rights transfer.
I.

Constitutional and Political A dvantages

Development rights transfer promises resource protection without
calling either for drastic inroads upon settled constitutional principles
or for public programs that are politically unfeasible. For constitu
tional purposes landowners with actionable interests include owners
of the protected resource and property owners within transfer dis·
tricts. Resource owners will be duly compensated for the curtailment
of

their development

nomic return

prerogatives

under

of landowners within

the

transfer

program.
districts

The

may

eco

be re

duced, of course, but the magnitude o f the reduction will not be
greater than, and typically will fall far short of, that which courts
have routinely sustained under the police power since

the Euclid

decision. 85
84. Applications or pending uses of the technique include the following: preserva
tion of the Old Locust Grove Farmhouse in suburban Montgomery County, Md., see
SPACE ADRIFT, suj1ra note 33, at 43; preservation of the Heurich Mansion, a Wash
ington, D.C., landmark, id. at 4 1 ; preservation of Amster Yard, Manhattan, see Hux table,
City Laudmark Gets a Chance for Survival, N .Y. Times, Aug. 2. 1970, § 8, at 1 , col.
l ; preservation and refurbishing of historic buildings in Manhattan's Special South
Street Seaport District, see Horsley, Air Rights Deal Saves South St. Seaport, N .Y.
Times, July 30, 1973, at 3 1 , col. 3; proteccion of agricultural land in Suffolk County,
New York, see SOUTHAMPTON, N.Y. ZONING ORD. No. 2 6, § 2-4-30 (1972), discussed in
Chavooshian & Norman, Transfer of Development Rights: A New Concept in Land
M anagement 7 (Rutgers University n.d.). State legislatures have also begun to show an
i nterest in the technique. In 1 97 1 , for example, the Illinois legislature approved an
extensive revision of that state's preservation enabling act prepared by the author to
permit the use of development rights transfer in aid of historic preservation. See Ill.
Pub. A. No. 77-1372 (Ill. Leg. Serv., Aug. 3 1 , 1971), in part codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 24, § 1 1 -48.2-lA, in part amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § l l - 48 . 2 - 2 - 6 ( 1 969). I n
Janua�y 1972, Senator William J. Goodman introduced a bill (Senate Bill No. 252,
1972) m the Maryland Senate authorizing local governments to create transfer districts
i n which devel?pment rights could be sold. See Rose, From the Legislatures, 1 REAL
.
ESTATE L.J. 276 (1973). � transfer bill has also been prepared for introduction in the
. ture m 1 973 that
New J erse y leg1sl
would employ the technique to preserve New
�
Jersey s prime agricultural land. Letter from B. Chavooshian, Land Use Specialist and
.
Program Advisor for Resource Management, Rutgers University, to the author, July
16, 1973.
Fe�eral interest in the transfer concept has been u nderscored by Secretary of the
Inteno.r Rogers C.B. Mortoi:i who has proposed a demonstration program under which
12 Chicago Sch?.ol �f Architecture land!!1arks wo� l? be brot� g? t under the protective
umbrella of a Nauon �l Cultural Park to be JOmtly administered by the National
.
Park Service and the city. In return for enactment of the Chicago Plan, p. 86 supra,
�hicago would receive the federal financial assistance necessary to seed the development
nghts bank and to cover related costs in the administration of the Park. See SPACE
ADRIFT, supra note 33, a t 62; Huxtable, A Plan for Chicago, N.Y. Times, April 15,
1973, § 2, at 23, col. 3.
85. See p. 108 infra.
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Adding compensation as a sweetener to the transfer package does
not guarantee that the proposed resource protection programs will
escape political opposition. Until quite recently, in fact, it may have
intensified resistance because it immunizes from constitutional at
tack measures that severely dilute private control over the use of
land. Increasingly, however, the p ublic outcry against environmental
despoliation as a result of land development is being forcefully
brought to the attention of courts and legislatures, which in turn
react by decreeing or enacting alternativess6 that the real estate com
munity will consider more onerous than transfer programs.
The portents for the economic feasibility of thoughtfully con
ceived transfer programs are favorable. Simulated application of the
Chicago Plan u nder the economic conditions prevailing in the Chi
cago real estate market in 1971 , for example, produced auspicious
results. s7 Favorable response to other forms of incentive zoning, such
as zoning bonuses and cluster and PUD zoning, is also encouraging.ss
At a minimum that response demonstrates the capacity of investors
in land development to adapt to a variety of developmental ground
rules through the pricing mechanism and other means, provided that
the rules are clearly spelled out i n advance and are evenhandedly
adm.inistered . Nevertheless, existing voi ds in land economics research
.
and in market experience caution against facile conclusions respecting
the transfer tec hnique's economic impact on resource owners and
landowners within transfer districts.
2.

Recoupment of

Governmen tally

Created

Values

zn

Private

Devel,ppment rights transfer promises to redress the most grievous
consequence of the American property system's .. bias i n favor of pri
.
vate property rights: government's failure to recoup for public use
an appropriate measure of the values that it creates i n privately held
86. These include the public trust doctrine, resurrected principles o f venerable origin
affirming public rights in riparian lands, population and building height limitation
referenda, 60-acre lot size minima, environmental impact statement requirements, build
ing permit moratoria, and governmental refusals to extend public services. See TAKING,
supra note 10, a t 3-50; UsE or LAND, supra note 2, at 33-73. Developers increasingly
must also contend with citizen-sponsored comprehensive plans, sophisticated conservation
organizations armed with batreries of attorneys spoiling for a fight, and recurring
media portrayals of developers as flinty-eyed bad guys thirsting for the almighty buck.
By permitting the transfer of development from ecologically-sensitive areas to locations
that are environmentally unobjectionable, the transfer technique offers developers a
strategy which assures them a fair return o n their investment while minimizing en
vironmentally-based opposition to their development programs.
87. See SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 33, at chs. 3, 4.
88. See NEW ZONING, supra note 27; W. WHYTE, supra note 61; Chicago Plan, supra
note 52, a t 575-77.
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Iand.s9 This failure runs through virtually all of the system's tra
ditional recoupment mechanisms, including real estate taxation,90
special assessment,91 diminution of eminent domain ai.vards through
the doctrine of special benefits, 92 and recapture of the cost of public
programs through resale of interests acquired by the government.93
I t has also undoubtedly contributed to the lack of experimentation
in the United States with public land banking programs.94 Com
mentators of a variety of persuasions w i th respect to economic in89. For an original discussion of possible methods of recoupment other than de·
velopment rights transfer, see Wexler, supra _ not� . 42, at 206- 1 3 . .
_
90. Assaults upon the real estate tax as 111cfhc1ent and mequ1tabl� an? en de m i c _ 111
public finance literature. See, e.g., H. GROVES, FINAi\CING GovERNMEi\T b9 ((;th e<l. 1 %·1);
Rawson, Property Taxation and Urban Development: Effects of the l'rope�·ty Tax _on
City Growth and Change IO (Urban Land Institute Research Monograph .No. 4, 1 9h ! J ;
Browning, Land Value Taxation: Promises a n d Pro b lem.s, 2 9 J . A M . IMT. l'LA\":'(J:.RS
3 0 1 , 302 ( 1963).
.
.
9 1 . In principle, a special a_ssessment frnanccs publ �. c .1mprov
�ments by returnm g; to
_
value accruing to pnvate property benelHcd
m
government amounts equal to mcreases
by the improvements. See a uthorities cited note 1 39 i11/ra. In p ra c t i ce , govern ment i s
usually shortchanged. Restrictive administration or j udicial in terpretation of the haiy
distinction between "general" and "'special" benefits (increases in value resulting from
the former not being assessable against the benefited parcel, see notes 1 39-42 infra) ex
cludes from consideration land values originating with the improvement. T he same
result obtains when, as frequently occurs, specially benefited land is cxcl ude<l from an
improvement district. Even when a parcel is conceded to be subject to assessment, more·
over, appraisal procedures often do not fully credit government's contribu lion LO its
value or do so on a regressive basis. Windfalls may be enjoyed by private owners i(
the increase in value exceeds the cost of the improvement. .Finally, special assessment
legislation typically mandates that only a fraction of the cost of an improvement may
be recovered through assessments, leaving the remainder to be returned through gen
eral tax revenues. See Spengler, The Increment Tax versus Special A ssessments (pls.
1 -3), 20 B ULL. NAT'L TA X Ass' N 258 (1935), 21 B ULL . NAT'L TAX Ass'i\ 14, 240 (1936);
Wexler, supra note 42, at 1 96-98.
92. This doctrine is founded on the view that the amount government 11111st pay
when it condemns less than a landowner's entire parcel should be diminished by any
appreciation in the value of the remainder attributable to the public improvement.
See 3 P . N1c:HOLS, T H E LAW O F E"'IINENT DOMAIN § 8.6206 (3d rev. ed. 1965). Sl'.c
generally Haar & Hering, Determinat ion of Benefits in Land Acq uisition. 51 CALIF.
L. REV. 833 (1963). But its effectiveness has been blunted in two rega rd s . .First, judicial
confusion att� 1�ding the disti �ction between "general" and "special" benefils has
eroded the effJCJency of the device as a recoupment mechanism. See id. at 868-69. Second,
many jurisdictions do not permit concede� special benefit s to be offset against t he
.
award for the parcel taken, set-off only being allowed agarnst
damages to the pa rce l
not taken. See id. at 879. Should these benefits exceed the latter' of course ' Lhey
provide a windfall for the property owners.
93. Responding to the nation's deep-seated laissez faire traditions, the courts have
�ealt uneasily wi.�h public pr�grams in which government j ntervenes, as entreprenelll',
_
_ tervent10n
m a formerly puvate economic sphere. Such m
1s patent when, to finance
the programs, government • resells or leases the interest that it has condemned, as in
th � case of urban renewal, trade center, navigation, and other capital projects durin"
this cen � ury. For an account of the grudging j udicial stance toward the recoupmcn�
feature m some of these progr_a ms as well as the legal pitfalls that confront others,
.
see Ch icago
Plan, supra note a2, at 605 - 1 1 . See genera lly R. Cus11�1AN, EXCESS Co:-;
DEM NATION (1917); Hodgman, A ir Rights and Public Finance: Public Use in a New
Guise, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 625 (1969).
94. For the impressive support that has existed among American land use com
mentators on behalf of land banking, see authorities collected in ALI MODEL LAND
DEVELOPMENT CODE, SrECIA1 NOTE ON LAND BANKING 50 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1 973). B u t
:
_ Pohcy
_
Alternatives and Dilemmas (Urban I n ·
se� S. Kamm, Land Banking: Public
sutute Paper No. 1 12-28, 19iO).
.

.
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stitutions have despaired of government's laxity in i ts recoupment
practices.9�
By regarding the development potential of private property as in
part a community resource, on the other hand, development rights
transfer enables government to share in the gains occasioned by rising
land values. Eminent domain awards paid to owners of protected re
sources will be discounted to eliminate windfalls attributable to gov
ernmental rather than private i n itiative. Marginal downward revi
sions in the development potentia l o f lands within transfer districts
will afford the funds required by these awards; these revisions will
be proportioned to what land economists have long regarded as the
"unearned increment" in the val u e of private property.96
Development rights transfer, in short, looks squarely to the land
development process itself for revenues to protect the community from
the unfortunate consequences tha t may fairly be attr i b u ted to that
process. Rather than advocating a n indiscriminate assa u l t on the com
pensation principle, it apportions the burdens and benefits of land
development on the basis of a coherent, socially defensible policy.

Reso lution of the Windfall/ Wipe-out Dilemma

3.

The random impact of land use regulations within

the private

sector is another source of grave imbalance in the nation's property
sysi:em. As the trend toward the adoption of stringen t resource pro
tection programs increases, windfalls and wipe-outs97 threaten to be
come endemic. To avoid this unfortunate result a balancing mecha
nism should be built into these programs that cancels out the un
j ustified gains and losses in the private sector. Under development
rights transfer programs owners o f restricted resources are not wiped
out , but are duly compensated, and the windfall of increased land
values that

property owners within

transfer districts

might other-

95.

See, e.g., J. COM MONS, I NSTITUTI01'AL ECONOM ICS 81 1 - 1 8 ( 1 934); H . GROVES, Fl
GOVER;\; M t:NT 96, 357 (liih ed. 1964) ; E. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATI ON 83, 491-539
(10th ed. 1 925); Haar, The Social Control of Urban space, in Cnms AND SPACE 2 1 8
(L. Wingo ed. 1 963); Wicksell, A New PrincijJle o f just Taxation, in CLASSICS IN m i;
T11rnRY O F PUBLIC .FINANCE 1 1 2 - 1 5 ( R . Musgrave & A . Peacock eds. 1 968); Eliot, A
l'rogressitie Tax ori /Jare La11d Values, 4 CITY !'LANNI:-;<; 83 ( 1 928); Spengler, Tile
T11xat io11 of Land l'alue /llrre111e11 ts, 1 7 J. LA:o>D & l'UR. Urn.rrY ECONOM ICS 54-58 (194 1 ) ;
Wex ler, .m/Jl'a note 42, at 200-06; cf. l'.. BARKLEY &: D. SECKLER, sufna note 1 3 , at 179.
This lacuna i n the nation's property p h i losophy accounts for the paradox that, a ft er
cre at i n g land values, the government is often stymied by them when it seeks to r e gul a te
pri1·atc land use decisions in the public i n te rest. See pp. 90-92 su/>ra. Thus, " [s]pecu·
lat<ns arc subsidized by our syste m of public i m p roveme n ts for private p ro fit. " 1 8
HousE AND H o M E , Aug. 1 960, a t 144.
96. See authori ties cited note 95 supra.
9i. See p. 83 & note 4 1 s up ra.
:'iANCJ:w;
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wise enjoy in consequence of these restrictions is offset by the pay
ments they must make for additional development rig·hts.

4.

Closing the Externalities Loop
A negative externality is defined by economists as a cost of a par

ticular enterprise that is not borne by the en trepreneur but is shifted
to the community.98 With the imperfect public understanding of en
vironmental problems that preceded pu b lication of Rachel Carson's

Silent Spring and other influential works of ecological scientists, the
externalities of land development were poorly grasped both popularly
and in the law. The variety and geograp h ic ex ten t of environmental
damage caused by land development was not recognized. Piecemeal
perception of both factors explains in part the misconceived bifur
cation of development posited by the harm/benefit rationale.
An important consequence of this recently acquired knowledge is
a greater awareness of the negative externalities that attend all forms
of land development.99 Indeed,

some commentators have identified

as the "underlying cause" of the environmental dilemma "an absence
of rules which make i t worthwhile for perpetra tors . . . to count as
their own costs the costs they impose on others . " 1 00
One function o f law is to return t h e cost of an ex ternality to
its creator when the harm is deemed sufficiently grave i n its societal
impact. In part, recent decisions,101 which in their quest for environ
mental quality have put in issue the continued vigor of the compen
sation requirement, are motivated by this objective. The same goal
animates developm e n t rights transfer, which "closes the externalities

� oop"

merly,

by charging the land development process with costs that for
and improperly, fell upon

the

community in

environmental depredation-or o f expensive remedial

the form of
programs

to

overcome it.
98. See P. BARKLEY &: D. SECK LER, supra note 1 3 , at 98- 122. See generally K . KAPP,
THE SOCIAL COSTS OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE (1950); Coase, The Problem of Socia l Cost,
3 J. LAW &: EcoN. I ( 1 960) .
. 99_ An �ppreciation _of the itn i;>act of discrete development decisions upon the en
vironment IS app�rent m the env1r� mmental � mpact statement requirements of federal
_
. See, e-g., National Envuonmental Policy Act, 92 U. S. C . § 4332
and state legislation
( 1 970); CAL. PUB. REs. CooE § 2 1 100 (Wes � supp- 1973). By insisting that the con

.
from a broad space-time perspective
seque �ces of .Proposed development be scr.utm1zed
and m relation . t? less har� ful alternat1v�s, this requirement conflicts directly with
the crude, atom1suc perception of the environment that has shaped so much of the
Anglo-American s ys �em of prop�rty law. See generally UsE OF L.A,ND, supra note 2,
_
the r_equ �rement as the " [b] est [m]echanism [s]o [f]ar" for
a t 195 : 208 (d�scnbmg
protecting environmental quahty, id. at 195).
100. p. BARKLEY &: D. SECKLER, supra note 1 3 , at 100.
101.

100

See note 1 0

supra.
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5.

Universality of Application

Development rights transfer is an extraordinarily flexible tool for
resource protection which can b e adapted to protect virtually any
low density resource endangered by market forces that press for higher
densities. Whether it will be economically feasible in any given con
text depends principally upon two factors: market demand for new
construction within the transfer district and zoning controls that
limit the residual density to levels that fall short of these demands.1 02
The first can be anticipated whenever low density resources are im
periled by market forces because it is these forces that have placed
the resources in peril; moreover, healthy construction markets which
can serve as sales areas for the transferred density can presumably be
found elsewhere within the jurisdiction where the resource is located.
The second factor depends solely u pon action by the pertinent legis
lative authority, assuming that the a llocation of private development
potential in the interest of resou rce protection is a proper exercise
of governmental power.
6.

Improved Physical Planning

Development rights transfer can also serve as a catalyst to im
proved land use planning. The Georgetown proposal, for example,
demonstrates how cities can employ transfers to encourage more ef
ficient transit system use.1 03 In a regional context transfers can func
tion to channel population to predetermined locations, such as those
at the metropolitan fringe where extensive capital improvement pro
grams are proposed or underway. But the most attractive of these
subsidiary advantages is the impetus that transfers provide for more
thoughtful, comprehensive land use planning by the city, region or
state. Transfers should not occur within a planning vacuum if frus
tration of other planning goals of equal or greater priority than
resource protection is to be avoided. Thus, built into the Chicago
Plan and the Puerto Rico proposal are extensive planning inquiries:
inventories of the number, location, and character of the pertinent
low density resource, selection a s transfer districts of areas in which
additional or redistributed density can be efficiently absorbed, and
identification of zoning trade-offs, such as reduced lot size, extra floor
area, or tower coverage, that will be allotted to development rights
purchasers.
102. For a detailed evaluation of the economic variables affecting the marketability
of development rights, see SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 33, at ch. 4.
103. See p. 90 supra. Other subsidiary planning advantages of the · transfer tech
nique are recounted in SPACE ADRIFT 50, 1 36.
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Improved Economic Planning

Development rights transfer would also respond to the economic
questions often left u nanswered by restrictive land use programs. I n
state sensitive area acts, for example, C assandra-like prefaces warn
ing of impending environmental doom and operative clauses cal l i n g
for the designation of loosely defined sensitive areas are found cheek
by jowl with blunt injunctions against uncompens� ted takings . 1 0 1
They fail to offer concrete guidance a s t o the cost of these resource
programs, the source of payments, and the reach of the ban against
uncompensated takings.1 os
Legislative silence perpetuates the imbalances in the American
property system and virtually guarantees that stringent resource pro
tection programs will be fought by influential private interests whose
support or acquiescence is vital to the success of many of these pro·
grams. Further, the buck is improperly passed to the courts, which
are ill-suited to deal knowledgeably w ith the complex economic issues
that review of these programs necessarily enta ils. Hence, an even
greater disarray among judicial approaches to the taking issue can be
anticipated than that which pervades the pre- 1 970 decisions.106
While transfer programs of the type suggested in this article cer
tainly do not provide all the answers, t hey at least ask the right
questions. Reasonable estimates of the cost, for example, of preserving
Puerto Rico's ecologically fragile areas or Chicago's landmarks107 can
be derived from an inventory of their n umber and type and from
projections of the costs attenaing the acquisition of their development
rights. The extent to which these costs can be offset by density trans
fers can be gauged by market studies fixing the probable value of
development rights within proposed transfer districts.1o s With this
data the jurisdiction can make realistic j udgments of what it can af
ford and of the relative costs and benefits of alternative priorities
104. See, e.g., Maryland Wetlands Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 725 (Supp. 1 972);
Virginia Wetlands Act, yA. CODE ANN. §§ 62. l - 1 3.6- 1 3. 1 31\2(a) (Supp. 1 973).
105. A notable excepllon to the observation in text has occu rred in Florida where
citizens in 1972 approved a bond issue for $240 million for the purchase of en
vironmentally endangered lands. See UsE oF LAND, supra note 2, at 65-66.
106. See, e.g., Dunham, Griggs v. A llegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years
of Expropriation Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 63, 105; Kusler, supra note 3, at 3 n.4;
Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by the Police Power: The Search for Inverse
Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. l , 1 4 ( 1 9 7 1 ) .
1 07 . For a detailed simulation o f these procedures a s applied t o the preservation
of four Chicago School of Architecture landmarks, see SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 33,
at ch. 3.
1 �8. For an exp�sition of the relevant appraisal techniques and an illustration of
their use to determine market demand for development rights within Chicago's Loop
.
area, see id. at ch. 4.
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among its land use goals. These judgments should assist it in for
mulating resource programs that both allay the justified concerns of
affected property owners and enable the courts to fashion norms that
furnish security of transactions for those engaged in commerce in land.
II.

Development Rights Transfer: A Legal Rationale

To the trad i tionalist zoning is a design, not a fiscal, tool. Used in
conjunction with development rig·hts transfer, on . the other hand,
it is both. Around this hybrid use of zoning cluster the legally con
troversial features of the technique. Disgruntled owners in transfer
districts can be expected to insist that government may fix density
levels only on the basis of substantive planning criteria-those re
lating to adequate light, air, pedestrian access, and similar factors.
But transfer programs regulate density for the additional purpose
of creating a market for development rights. Hence, these owners
will conclude, the programs must fall as improper encroachments
upon private property rights.
This objection may take various forms. It may be contended that
raising funds for environmental betterment lies withi n the province
of the taxing rather than the police power. Transfer programs' cost
shifting and residual density features may be challenged on taking
grounds. Contentions that transfer programs are exclusionary and
improperly discriminate against landowners within transfer districts
may give rise to equal protection attacks.
Two statutory challenges arising under pertinent state zoning· en
abling acts can be anticipated as well. First, it may be insisted that
these acts do not authorize communities to employ zoning in aid
of the broader environmental and amenity goals that transfer pro
grams ,�ddress. Second, the programs' dual bulk system may be said
to violate the dictate i_n most of these acts that "[a ]11 [zoning] regu
lations shall be uniform for each class or kind of buildings through
out eac11 district." 109
Though formidable, these obj ections can be overcome by securing
judicial approval of the principle that the developmen t potential of
private property is in part a community asset and by modifying ap
plicable land use legislation to permit the implementation of this
principle in the context of specific transfer programs. This section
109. ADVISORY COMM ITTEE ON ZONING, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING
ENABLING ACT UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS § 2
(rev. ed. 1 926).
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addresses the first of these concerns by offering a legal rationale for
development rights transfer, but leaves the specific content of re
quired amendments to lawmakers in each j urisdiction. ! h� discussion
do.es, however, identify areas where statutory change is hkely to be
advisable.
A.

Development R ights Transfer as a Regulatory/Fiscal Hybrid

Zoning is grounded in the state's police power. Is it then necessarily
impermissible to build into a zoning measure provisions intended to
raise funds for resource protection? Putting the question of statutory
authority to one side for the moment, the answer ought surely to
be no. The difference between the police and taxing powers is hardly
clearcut and may be so slim in specific instances as to be unrecog
nizable.11 0 Courts have long considered i t neither surprising nor obl l O. From a functional perspective the premise that the two powers mt! st be rigidly
compartmentalized is dubious. For years public finance scholars have rejected 1t oi:t
of hand. See, e.g., J. COMMONS, supra note 95, at 820; E. SELICMA�, supra note 9:>,
a t 402-06. Professor Commons, for example, has written that
the. police power is none other than the sovereign power to restrain or suppress
what is deemed, by the dominant interests, to be disadvantageous, and to promote
and foster what they deem advantageous for the commonwealth. Taxation, then,
is the most pervasive and privileged exercise of the police power . . . . Even when
not consciously intended to be regulative, taxes nevertheless regulate, for they,
like the protective tariffs, determine the directions in which people may become
wealthy by determining directions in which they may not become wealthy
It is impossible to avoid these effects of taxes, therefore impossible to escape the
police power of taxation, therefore impossible to look upon taxes of any kind
whatever as merely a means of obtaining revenue . . . . Taxation is, in fact, a
process of obtaining public revenue by proportioning inducement to obtain profits.
J. COMMONS, supra at 820.
Professor Seligman makes the same point in his query: "Shall we call the Indian
duty on opium a tax and refuse the same name to the American internal revenue
charge, because India looks primarily to revenue, and the Uni ted States to regulation?"
E. SELIGMAN, supra at 403.
Legal scholars too have recognized the ephemerality of the distinction, functionally
considered. De�pite his � u thorship of the revenue/regulatory test, for examp�, Cooley
concedes that m many mstances custom alone determines whether a measure will be
characterized as a tax or as a police power enactment. 4 T. COOLEY, THE LAw OF T AXA noN
§ 1 784, at 35 14 (4th ed. 1 924) [hereinafter cited as C oo LE Y ] . Further, modern land
use commentators have ar�ued that th � taxing and police powers may be used inter·
c hangeably as . the foundat10n for planmng techniques such as the subdivision exaction.
See n�te 205 mfr�. Especially noteworthy in this regard is the concl usion of Heyman
and G1lhool that [r l eg<1;rdless of labe� , properly constitu ted exactions for a wide variety
of purposes �re constllutionally pe �m1ss1ble." Heyman and Gilhool, The Constitutionali

ty ?f. Imposing_ Increased Commun i ty Costs on New Suburban Residents through Sub
.
div1s1 �n Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1 1 19, l l 55 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Su bdivision
Exactions] .
For support of this conclusion, compare Associated Home Builders of the Greater

East Bay In � . v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal: ?d 633, 484 P .2 ? 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630,
appe0; l d1sm1ssed, �04 U.S. 878 (1971) (sustammg forced dedication or substitu te fee
exaction as a pohce power measure), with Associated Homebuilders of the Greater
E�st. Bay, Inc. v. City of N ewark, 18 Cal . App. 3d 1 07, 95 Cal. Rptr. 648 ( 1 9 7 1 ) (sus
tammg a l.evy keyed to the number of bedrooms in dwellings as a license tax on
the occupat10n of constructing buildings).
•
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jectionable that police power measures are often accompanied by dis
tinct fiscal effects-including direct i mposition of fees11 1�just as tax
ing measures are frequently attended by unmistakable

regulatory

results.112
But the inquiry does not end with the conclusion that transfer pro
grams are u nobjectionable simply because they combine regulatory
and fiscal elements. That conclusion establishes only that state legis
latures

may a u thorize local governments to enact these programs un

der the police power. To avoid ensnarement in the u l tra vires trap
local governments must be prepared to demonstrate that legislatures

have done so. A sound enabling act113 will assist them in showing,
first, that there is a statutory predicate for the local ordinance; second,
that the ordinance is a police power rather than a taxing measure;
and third,

that the ordinance comports with the requirements of

police power doctrine.
The significance of the first of these showings lies, of course, in
the status of local governments a s creatures of the state possessing
only those powers accorded them b y the state.114 More complicated
is the need for the second-convincing the court that

a

transfer pro

gram is a police power, not a taxing . measure. Taxing enactments
must pass muster under a gamut of state constitutional and statutory
constraints which, depending upon the type of tax involved, may
include uniformity, w ; ad valorem imposition , 11 6 and tax rate limi
tations.117 If deemed taxing measures, transfer programs will almost

ll I. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of
Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 ( 1 97 1) (subdivision
exaction legislation requiring payment of a fee in lieu of land dedication under pre
scribed conditions); Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Improvement Comm'n,
307 A.2d 1 (Me. 1 973) (license for clean-up of oil spills in state waters) (semble);
Garden State Racing Ass'n v. Cherry Hill Twp., 42 N.J. 454, 201 A.2d 554 (1964) (license
fee, receipts from which were used to regulate increased traffic and parking caused
by racetrack activities); Sproul v. Oregon, 234 Ore. 579, 383 P.2d 754 ( 1 963) (levy on
forest lands for fire suppression purposes).
112. See illust,rations cited in H. GROVES, supra note 95, at 42-44; E. SELIGM AN , supra
note 95, at 402-06.
1 1 3. In order to probe the legal issues posed by defective enabling legislation, dis
cussion in the remainder of the text assumes that local governments rather than state
or regional age � cies will administer development rights transfer programs. As the Puerto
.
Rico
proposal illustrates, however, these programs may be implemented at any level
of government depending upon the goals which the particular program is designed
to achieve. See SPACE A DRIFT supra note 33, a t 1 76.
l l4. See cases and authorities cited in S. SATO & A. VAN ALSTY NE STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW 85-95 (�970).
l l5. See � COOLEY, supra note l lO, at § 260; 1 6 McQUILLIN� MUNICIPAL CORPORA
TIONS, Taxation § ·44.19 (1972 rev. vol.).
ll6. See I CooLEY, mpra note 1 1 0, at §§ 127, 153; 16 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL COR
PORATIONS, Taxation § 44.17a (1972 rev. vol.).
l l7. See 16 M cQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, Taxation § 44.25 (1972 rev. vol.).
,

,
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certainly run afoul of one or more of these constraints, 1 1 8
their structure is s ubstantially modified. 1 1 9

u n less

An express statutory declaration that development rights transfer
is a police power technique will be helpful, though not conclusive.
The court can be expected to make

an

independent appraisa J , 1 c"

utilizing Judge Cooley's classic litmus for distinguishing police pcmcr
from taxing measures-namely, whether development rights tra nsfer's
primary goal is "regulatory" or "fiscal" i n nature . 1 :! 1 Despi te t h e
_
test's vagueness, there seems little reason to doubt that t h e technique
will be labeled regula tory if the court otherwise finds it proper. T h e
purpose o f transfer programs, after a l l , is identical w i t h that o ( con
ventional land use endeavors: channeling private development deci
sions

toward results

that comport with

the

jurisdiction's

physical

planning objectives.
A contrary conclu s ion would require

that the court wrench the

income-generating component of the transfer program from its over
all regulatory setting. Courts have refused to isolate t h e fiscal ele
ment

in

their

control. Thus,

evaluation

of

other

hybrid

communities may zone

to

forms

of development

encourage

industry and

other lucrative sources of tax revenue to settle within their bound
aries.122 They may a l so impose dual bulk systems i n conj unction ·with
cluster and PUD zoning ordinances that offer the developer a trade
of increased density for dedication of a prescribed percentage of his
land to commun i ty use. 1 23 Withou t any trade they may secure the
same result through subdivision ordinances that mandate dedication
or monetary payments as a condition to subdivision plat approvaJ .1'>1
The courts have approved these

measures

despite

their

conceded

fiscal elements and, as to the latter two, despite the fact that acqui
sition of private land for public use has traditionally been financed
through the taxing power.
l l8. If restrictions on densities within transfer districts we1e h eld equi\ alent to a
real estate tax on lands located there, for example, the program would be im a l i datcd
because the " tax" would meet neither the uniformity nor ad valorem imposition
requirements.
1 19. See pp. 1 25 - 26 infra.
120. See note 1 1 1 supra.
1 2 1 . See 4 COOLEY, supra note l l O, at § I 784. On the di s tin c tio n between measures
founded on the police power and those ba e? on t_he power of taxation, see generally 9
�
Mc mLLIN, MUN ICIPAL Co�PORATIONS, Mu 1 c1pal � tc nses and Permits § 26. I G ( 1 964 rc1 .
! �
�
vol.), Note, � Re-Ev� luation of the Judicial Criteria for Detern1111111g lite R easona/Jle
_
ness of Mumczpal
License Fees, l l RUTGERS L. REV. 702 (1957); N o te, Police p01ar
Taxation, 4 WILLAMETTE L .J . 532 (1967).
1 22. See Gruber v. Raritan Twp., 39 N .J . l , 1 86 A.2d 489 ( 1 962). See generally D.

q

HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW §
'

inafter cited as URBAN PLAN NING] .
123. See cases cited notes 189-90 infra.
124. See note 137 infra.
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These decisions reflect the judiciary's unwillingness to block in
novative land

use

programs by invoking precious

conceptual dis

tinctions between the police and taxing powers. They are pragmatic
in tone, disap pointingly so fo those who would prefer more thoug·ht
ful treatment of the differences between the two powers. Yet they
anticipate remarkably well the

growing recognition

among influ

ential scholars125 and study commissions126 that solution of the na
tion's grave land use problems must start with the
physical planning and economic

planning are,

premise that

at base,

two sides

of the same coin.
The third showing-compliance of the enabling act and the im
plementing ordinance with police power doctrine-should prove the
least troublesome. Under police power doctrine, the burdened class
must be shown to be the class whose actions have created the evil
that the !egisl.a tion is intended

to

remedy127 and revenues raised

from the police power imposition must be devoted exclusively to
the public objectives that motivated their adoption . 1 28 The nexus
between , development and environmental harm should fulfill the
first requirement, especially if its existence appears

as an express

legislative finding in · the enabling act's preface. And restricting the
use of development rights sales funds solely for the environmental ob

jectives of the par tic ular transfer program can be achieved simply
by writing the pertinent limitations into both the enabling act and
the ordinance .

B.

Development Rights Transfer and Due Process

l.

The Confiscation O bjection
Whether the residual densities prescribed for transfer districts will

trigger a successful taking challenge to transfer programs depends
upon the m a gnitude of the reduction in economic return that courts
125. See, e.g., Rawson, Property Taxation and Urban Development: Effects of
the Property Tax on City Growth and Change 7-8 (Urban Land Institu te, Research
Monograph N o . 4, 1961); Browning, Land Value Taxation: Promises and Problems, 29
J. A M . INST. PLANNERS 301 , 307 (1963); Hagman, The Single Tax and Land Use Planning:
Henry George Updated, 1 2 UCLA L. R Ev. 762, 782-88 (1965).
126. See UsE OF L A N D, supra note 2, a t 19-22, 27-29, 103·43, 2 1 9-6 1 . See generally
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING: A DECENT H OM E ( 1 968); NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS: BUILDING THE AM ERICAN C ITY, H.R. Doc. No. 34,
9lst Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
127. See, e.g., I COOLEY, supra note l lO, a t � 268; E. FREUND, supra note 4, at 635.
128. Under settled police power doctrine, a logical connection must exist between
the object sought to be accomplished by a regulatory ordinance and the means pre
scribed for this end. Clearly, applying revenue raised in conjunction with a regulatory
scheme to some pu rpose unrelated to that scheme would violate this requirement.
Cf. Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. A pp . 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 ( 1 957).
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will ,deem nonconfiscatory and the severity of the particular pro
gram's restrictions. Neither variable should prove the undoing of a
carefully formulated transfer program.
Recent cases, 129 some assert, support the view that, short of an
actual appropriation by government, regulation of private land use
for a public purpose can never constitute a taking. 130 This interpre
tation is perilous for draftsmen of transfer legislation. Aside from
its blatant unfairness as an across-the-board prescription, it may in
retrospect be viewed as an overbroad reading of these cases, which
represent the position of little more than a handful of state courts.
Reliance upon it is u n necessary in any event because established
zoning doctrine provides more than enough

leeway to legitimate

the density limitations that are likely to be required to guarantee
a transfer program's economic feasibility. The Eu clid decision buried
the claim that zoning measures are constitutionally infirm simply
because they preclude landowners from devoting their property to
its most profitable use. Instead, these measures are routinely sustained
so long as they advance the community's general welfare and the
.
property is susc eptible to some reasonable, albeit less profitable, type
or intensity of development.131
That resource protection-the goal of transfer programs-advances
community welfare cannot be seriously contested. But the reason
ableness of the extent of development permitted under the residual
densities prescribed for transfer districts cannot be assessed without
reference to the second variable-the stringency of these densities un
der the particular transfer program. This issue cannot be resolvtd
in the abstract. Studies indicate, however,

that restraints upon re

sidual densities should fall well within the range sanctioned by es
tablished zoning doctrine.132 Nor should it be assumed that transfer
129. See note 10 supra.
130. See TAKING, supra note 10, at 238; UsE OF LAND, supra note 2, at 175 .
1 3 1 . . � representati:ire �orr � ulation of this principle appears in an opinion written
by a d1stmgmshed zonmg Jllnst:
[P] roperty nee� i:iot be �oned to permit every .use to which it is adapted nor must
all property s1m1larly s�tuated_ b� accorded identical treatment. To so require
would frustra�e the zonm g: ob1ec t1ye of a well-balan �ed community according to
.
_
a comprehensive p� an .. It 1s suff1c1ent
1f the regulauons permit some reasonable
use of the property m light of the statutory purpose.
Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsipanny-Troy Hills Twp., 40 N.J.
. 539 557
1 93 A.2d 232, 242 (1 963) (Hall, J.).
. 132. See Department of City P�anning, San Francisco Downtown Zoning Study,
Fmal Report ( ! 966); Ruth, Economic Aspects of the San Fra ncisco Zoning O rdinance
Bon"!s Syste!'i, m N£w ZONING, supra note 27, at 159. The economic investigation sup
P<?rtl �g zomn g bonuse� offered to dev �lopers. within the Manhattan B roadway Theater
_
D1stnct w�o agr�e to mclude theaters 111 thelf pro1ects
is recounted in Weinstein, How
_
Was Changed to Induce the Construction of Legitimate Theaters'
New York s Zoning
in NEW ZONING, supra note 27, at 1 3 1 . See note 55 supra.
'
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programs will be open-ended ventures, whether in

terms of costs

that communities will incur or restrictions that landowners within
transfer districts will experience under them. The community is free
to expand or contract the scope of its resource protection goals, to
supplement f unds obtained from development rights sales with gen
eral revenues, and to make other appropriate adjustments. In ad
di tion, the constraints of practical politics, a concern for social equity,
and the desire to avoid vulnerability to constitutional challenge should
deter imprudent governmental u s e of the transfer device.
2.

The Cost-Shi/ting Objection
The contention that the cost of resource protection programs may

not be internalized to the land development process cannot be dis
missed by citing contrary precedents because none addresses the issue
precisely as it arises in the transfer context. In analogous contexts
courts have approved police

power programs in which costs were

shifted to those whose activities created the need for the programs.133
Within the specific area of land use the subdivision exaction prec
edents1H are the most pertinent. Despite significant differences be
tween the

subdivision exaction

and

transfer

techniques, 135

these

precedents offer a useful point o f departure for predicting judicial
response to transfer programs. For our purposes they can be divided
rou ghly into two groups: decisions that evaluate subdivision exac
tions

(or substitute fees)

under special assessment

doctrine13a and

133. See, e.g., Po rt lan d Pipe Linc Corp. v. E n vironmental I mprovement Corn m ' n ,
:mi :\.2d 1 (Mc. 1 973) (semble); Garden S t a te R acing Association v. Cherry Hill Twp . .
4'..! N.J. 4'i4, 20 1 A.2d 554 ( 1 964); Sproul v. Oregon, 234 Ore. 579, 383 P.2d 754 ( 1 963) ;
Drinnen v. City of K noxv ille , 212 Tenn. 270, 369 S.W.2d 562 ( 1 963). W i t h respect to
the amou n t of the police power imposition, which is typically cas t as a " l icense fee,"
Cooley observes:
[ I ) t is proper a n d reasonable tu take i n to account not only the ex penses merely
of d i rect re g u l at ion , b u t all the i11cidc11tal cu1ueq uences that may be likely to
subject lite pu blic to cost iu co11seque11ce of t h e busi11ess lice11s e d . /11 so111e cases
the i11cide11tal co11scq111·11ce.1 are 111uch t h e 111ost i111J10rla11t, a11d, in deed, are what
are f1ri11cipally /tad ill vi1:w wlirn tlte fee is decided 11J1ou • . . . What is a rea
sonable kc depends la rgely upon sound legislat i ve dism.:tion, and i t w i l l be pre·

sumcd that

the fee is reasonable i n amou n t , unless the con trary appears on the
face of the l a w i t self, or is csta hlishcd by proper evidence.
·I Coou:r, supra note 1 I O , § 1 809, at 3555-56 (e m phasis added). Sec ge11cra lly authorities
cited su/ira note 1 2 1 .
134. See, e.g., notes I %·3i infra. The relevant l ega l literature i s collected i n Landau,
Urban Conce11 tralim1 a n cl l.a11d Exacti<ms for Recreatio11al Use: Some Co11.1 t i t utio11al
Problems i11 A1amlatory Dedicalio11 Ordinances iii Iowa, 22 DRAKE L. REV. i i , 78 n.45
(19i2).
1 :1:"1. See p. 1 1 5 &: note 1 68 iu/ra.
1 31i. Su, e.g., Kclh<'r v. City of lipland, 1 55 Cal. :\pp. 2cl 63 1 . 3 1 8 l'.2d 'i6 1 ( 1 957) ;
Pioneer Trust & Sav i n gs !lank '" V i l l age of Mount Prospect, 22 I l l . 2d 3i5, 1 76 N.E.2d
i99 ( l !l6 1 ) ; G u lcst .-\ ssoc iates, Inc. v. Town of '.\:cw burg, 25 M isc. 2d 1004, 209 N.Y.S.2d
i:!!J _( 1 960), aff'd, 1:; .\pp. Div. 2d 8 1 'i , 2 2 :i N .Y.S.2d 538 ( 1 962). overruled, .Jcnad, Inc.
1. \'11lagc of Scarsdale, 18 :\ .Y.2d i8, 2 1 8 � .E.2<l 6i3, 2il N.Y.S.2d 955 ( 1 966); Haugen
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the more recent decisions that emphasize their character as police
power measures. 1 37 I n the following section it is conceded that devel
opment rights transfers, like subdivision exactions, probably do not
comport with special assessment criteria,138 but it is argued that they
do satisfy the less demanding requirements of the police power.
a.

Development Righ ts Transfers and the Special A ssessment

Special assessment doctrine justifies governmental impositions on
the basis of the "special benefit" that assessed property receives from
the public improvement financed by the special assessment.139 Be
cause land values within the general area of the improvement often
increase, the concept of special benefit is ostensibly confined by three
criteria: spatial proximity of the improvement to the assessed prop
erty; 1 4 0 inclusion of the specific improvement in the restricted cat
egory of public facilities that may be so financed; 141 and propor
tionality between the amount of the assessment and the provable
benefits accruing to the assessed property . 1 42
v. Gleason, 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2� 1 08 ( 1 961). See a ls o Jenatl, Inc. v. Village of Sca rs dal e ,
supra, 1 8 N.Y.2d at 86, 2 1 8 :N.E.2d at 67i, 2 7 1 N .Y.S.2d at 959 (Van Voohris, J . ,
d i sse n ting); Jordan v . Vi l lage of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2tl 608, 623, 1 3 i :'-i ."·.2Ll
442, 450 (1 965) (Hallows, J., d is senting) . Under these opinions the challenged suli·
division ex ac t ion measures were deemed unauthorized by per t i ne nt enabling legislation
and, in Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, supra, pos·
si b ly u nconstitutional as well . Concluding that the measures do not comport w i t h cri·
t eri a derived from special assessment doctrine and u nwilling to sustain them on broader
police power gro un d s, the opinions analogize the exactions to taxes, i.e . , impositions
for genera l governmental p ur p oses , which fail to satisfy one or mo re of the taxation
requirements. See p. 105 supra.
1 37. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of the G reater East Bay, Inc . v. Ci ty of
Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P .2d 606, 94 Cal. R p tr . 630 ( 1 9 7 1 ) ; A u n t Hack Ridge
Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 160 Conn. 109, 273 A.2d 880 ( 1 9i0); J e n ad , Inc.
v. Village of Sca rsd al e, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 2 7 1 N .Y.S.2d 955 ( 1 966); Jordan
v. Village ? f Men'?monee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 1 37 N.W.2d 442 ( 1 965).
1 38. This q uest 1 0n has been vigorously debated in the literature. for the view that
s u bd i vi si on exa � tio!'ls should be evaluated only under special assessment theory and
that forced dedication of school or pa r k lands cannot be sustained under that theor Y ,
sec Reps & Smith, Control of Urban Land Su bdivisions, 1 4 SYRA C USE L. REV. 405
(1963). He.y��n and G_ilhool take a more expansive view of the matter, claiming, first,
that subd1vm�n exa <;t10ns can be sustained alterna tivcly o n speci a l assessment, poli ce
_
assessmen t theory is su fficiently
power, or taxmg rauonales, and, sec<;>nd '. that special
broad to cou ntena n ce the forced <led1cat10n of school and park lands. See Su bdivision
Exactions, supra note 1 10.
1 39 . See, e.g., 14 M <;_QUILLIN, Mur-;1c1rAL CORPORATIONS, Special Taxation a n d Local
Assessments § 38.02 (1910 rev. v ol.) ; I W. PAGE & P . JO N ES, TAXATI0:-1 BY LoC,\L AND
SPECIAL ASSESSMENT § 1 1 , at 1 6-22, § 1 1 8, a t 197-203 (1909).
140. See, e.g., W. WINTER, THE SPECIAL ASSESSMEi\T TODA\' 18 ( 1 952); S pengl er ,
The Increment Tax versus Special Assessments, 20 B UL L . N AT'L TAX A ss'N 958 259
( 1 93 5 ) . But see Subdivision Exactions, supra note l lO, at 1 1 4 8 - 49.
1 4 1 . See Reps & S mi th , supra no t e 138, at 4 1 0 ; 14 M cQUILLIN, MUi\ICil'AL CoR
PORAl:U�� s, Specia � Taxation and L ocal Assess ments §§ 38 . 1 1 -.29 (1970 rev. vol.). B u t see
Subd1v1S1on Exactions, supra note l lO, at l l49.
142. See 14 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, Special Taxation and Local As·
sessments § 38.31 (1970 rev. vol.); 1 W. P AG E & P. JONES, supra note 139, § 1 1 , at 1 6-22.
�
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The forced dedication of land within a subdivision or the payment
of fees for school or recreational facilities elsewhere w ithin the com
munity does not easily meet these stringent requirements. Although
lands dedicated within the subdivision meet the spatial proximity test,
lands acquired elsewhere in the community may not. 1 43 Also dubious
on the basis o f traditional special assessment doctrine is the inclusion
of educational and recreational facilities within the class of improve
ments that may be financed through assessments.144 Demonstrating
that land within the subdivision increases in value in correlation with
the value of the dedicated parcel or the amount of the substitute
fee raises difficult questions of cost accounting that are not easily
resolved.1 4 ;; A further complication, moreover, is the deep-seated
American sentiment, implicit throughout the earlier subdivision ex
action cases, 1 46 that recreational and educational expenses ought to
be borne by the community as a whole, not by developers or new
comers to the community.
These cases warn that development rights transfer will encounter
hostility if courts analogize the technique to special assessment. The
resource whose protection is financed under the transfer program
will typically be distant from the burdened parcels; its benefits, more
over, will radiate throughout the j urisdiction instead of being lo
calized to these parcels. Amenities and environmental resources do
not fall within the traditional listing of improvements that may be fi
nanced under special assessments. Finally, the price of development
rights will not be tied to an increase in value accruing to transfer
districts by virtue of resource protection. Rather, it will be made by
the market on the basis of value increases attributable to the extra
density.
Courts, however, are not likely to analogize development rights
transfer to special assessment. T o begin with, the rationales sup
porting the techniques differ. Unlike special assessment, develop
ment rights transfer posits, first, that the externalities of land de
velopment warrant shifting to it the cost of resource protection, and,
second, that increases in private land values attributable to gov
ernmental initiatives and general community growth can be recouped.
The former premise is irrelevant to special assessment doctrine, which
143.
144.
145.

See note 136 supra.
See note 1 41 supra.
A

proposed model for cost-accounting analysis is discussed in Subdivisio11 Exac

tions, supra note l lO, at 1 14 1 ·46.
146. See note 136 supra.
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does not key the imposition t o the assessed parcel's prospective uses.147
The latter imports a more comprehensive concept of "benefit " than
special assessment. 148 Furthermore, recent decisions have relied more
heavily upon the roomier standards of the police power to evaluate
the propriety of subdivision exactions. 1 49 J udicial recourse to these
standards to scrutinize

development

rights

transfer can

be

antici

pated because the transfer technique is considerably more congruent
with the exaction device than with special assessment.

b.

Development Rights Transfer and the Police Power
In shifting to the police power recent subdivision exaction dcci

sions100 place greater emphasis on the community-wide benefits re
sulting from the exactions than on those accruing to the particular
subdivision. This shift reflects the courts'

appreciation of the prac

tical difficulties that large-scale developme n t poses for local govern
ments151 and their willingness to favor the · latter in the

trade-off

between developer profits and sound commutiity growth.1;;:.? Thus,
the improvement need not be located "Yithin or contiguous to the
subdivision as long as i ts benefits are available to subdivision resi
dents.153 It may benefit the remainder of the community, as - well as
147. For this reason Page and Jones insist that special assessment is not a p oli ce
power technique. "Under special assessment the benefits received by the assessed property
must equal or exq:ed the amount of the assessment, while under the police p ower
no a ttention is paid to the fact tha t · [the performance of a d u ty ] will confer any
exceptive . [Jic] benefJ.t on [ the ] property, as i n cases of .local assessments. 011

the contrary, this power justifies the exaction from [the property owner] of
that which will lessen the value of his estate by depriving h i m of what wo ttld,
under other circumstances, be a lawful use and enjoy ment of his property . . . .

1 W. P AG E & P. JONES, TAXATION BY LOCAL AND SPECIAL ASSESSMENT § 92, a t 1 5 0 ( 1 909)
(emphasis added). See also E. FREUND, supra note 4, at 635. Its foundation upon the
principle of special benefits also precludes special assessment from classification as a
conventional tax. See p. 125 infra.
148. See p. 1 10 supra. It is this larger concept of benefit that u nderlies the
proposal advanced by land economists and public finance specialists for a land value
increment tax. See, e.g., Eliot, supra note 95, at 85; Spengler, supra note 95, at 56.
149. See note 137 supra.
.
15Q u.
1 5 1 . See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of
Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d �33, 638, 484 P.2d 606, 6 1 0 - 1 1 , 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 634-35
.
,
( 1 9 7 1 ) ; Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Plannmg Comm'n, 1 60 Conn. 109, 1 1 3 - 1 5,
273 A.2d 880, 883-84 (1970); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 1 8 N.Y.2d 78, 8'1-85, 2 1 8
N.E.2d 673, 676, 2 7 1 N.Y.S.2d 955, 958-59 ( 1 966).
1 5 �. In one subdivisi ?n �xaction cas� t he court c�aracterize � the u n ?crlying conflict
.
.
.
..
�s pit.Un� the de�eloper .s 1_11t.erest m flllmg the entire area with housing" against the
pubhc mterest m . mamtammg a more healthful open space environment." Aunt
Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 1 60 Conn. 1 0 9 1 1 9 273 A.2d 880
885-86 (1970).
1 5 3 . See, e.g., Associated Home Bu ilders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. C i ty of
Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. �� 633, 4�4 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971) (sustaining fee
.
to be used for acqms1t1on or improvement of parkland within three-quarter mile
radius of subdivision) ; Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N .Y.2d 78, 2 1 8 N.E.2d
673, 2 7 1 N .Y.S.2d 955 (1 966) (sustaining fee to be used for "park, playground and
recreational purposes" anywhere within village).
'
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these residents, provided that the subdivision is a contributing factor to
the need for the facility.154 The improvement may be other than those
traditionally financed by special assessment though it apparently must
tie into the community's physical planning program. 1 5 5 Finally, no
requirement is expressed in these opinions that the cost of the sub
division jmprovement must correlate with the enhanced value ac
cruing to subdivision land as a consequence of the improvement.156

Associated Home Builders

v.

C ity of Walnut Creek/57 a 1 972

California Supreme Court decision, exemplifies this liberalizing trend.

A group of developers challenged a California statute and imple
menting ordinance requiring either dedication of recreational lands
or payment of a fee to be used for acquiring recreational facilities
within a three-quarter mile radius of the subdivision. Predictably,
the plaintiffs took refuge in speci a l assessment doctrin e . Their prin
cipal claim was that the developer or fu ture residents of the sub
division could be compelled under the legislation " t o pay for rec
reational facilities the need for which stems not from the develop
ment of any one subdivision but from the needs of the community
as a whole . " 1 5 8 They insisted that the exaction must " n ec essarily and
primarily benefit the particular subdivision"109 and questioned wheth
er recreational facilities may be secured through such exactions.160
The court rejected these claims by testing the legislation against
the less confining standards of t h e police power, 1 6 1 noting the un154. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of
Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 637·41, 484 P.2d 606, 610-12, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 634-36
(1971); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 6 1 7 - 1 8, 1 37 N.W.2d 442,
447-48 (1965). Cases approving the proprie t y of fees in lieu of dedication deviate some·
what from this requirement because the fees may typically be used to acquire land
some distance from the subdivision. See cases c ited note 153 supra . In these cases, how
ever, the pertinent legislation allows the mu nicipality to have recourse to fees only
if dedication of lands within the subdivision is inappropriate given the subdivision's
small size or the presence of an existing school or park within or nearby the sub
division. Hence, they too require nearby school or parkland accessible to and serving
the needs of the residents of that subdivision.
155. Local governments have utilized the exaction technique principally to acquire
school and recreational lands in addition to obtaining more traditional improvements
such as sewers, streets, and drainage facilities. Existing practice suggests that the tech
nique will likely be limited to achievement of the community's physical planning
objectives. That this limitation may be judicially required is suggested in a recent
influential case which distinguished between the legitimate employment of the tech
nique for a community's recreational land needs and its use to serve the "more gen
eral and diffuse need [that new residents create] for such areawide services as fire
and police protection." Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City
of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 642, 484 P .2d 606, 613, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 637 (1971)
(dictum).
156. See note 137 supra.
157. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971).
158. Id. at 637, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
159. Id. at 640, 484 P.2d at 6 l l 12 94 Cal. Rptr. at 635-36.
160. Id. at 64 1 , 484 P.2d at 613, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 637 .
161. Id. at 644, 484 P.2d at 6 1 5 , 94 Cal. Rptr. at 639. Also pertinent in the court's
.
view was the addi tion to the California Constitution in 1 966 of Article XXVIII, § l ,
-

,
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fortunate conseque nces that shrinkin g open space and nsmg popula
tion have wreaked upon development patterns in Californ ia and the
nation.1 62 In the court's view commun ities may properly consider
general communi ty needs for recreation al land as well as those of a
0:1
particular subdivision in the formulation of subdivision program s. 1
The court refrained from passing on the conten tion that the land m u s t
primarily serve the recreational needs of the subdivision because the
challenged legislation expressly addressed this requirement,164 but i t did
mark in dictum its sympathy for the position advanced by the Sierra
Club, as amicus curiae, that exactions can be justified under the
police power even if employed for recreational facilities used by the
general public rather than devoted to the special needs of future
subdivision residents . 1 6 5
The court did not agree that sustaining the legislation would be
tantamount to approving the use of exactions for the indiscriminate
financing of governmental operations. I nstead, it distinguished the
benefits that. subdivision residents would enj oy under the challenged
legislation as "less diffuse" than those associated with general gov
ernmental services such as fire and police protection.166 In addition,
the court hinted strongly at the negative externalities theme and
the fundamental indivisibility of the land development process. The
plaintiffs' argument, the court reasoned,
overlooks the unique problem involved in utilization of raw
land. Undeveloped land in a community is a limi ted resource
which is difficult to conserve in a period of increased population
pressure. The development of a new subdivision in and of itself
has the counter-productive effect of consuming a substantial
supply of this precious commodity, while at the same time in
creasing the need for park and recreational land. I n terms of
economics, subdivisions diminish supply and increase demand. 16 7
which declares that open space and scenic beauty advance the "economic and social
well-being of the state and its citizens." CAL. CONST. art. XXVII I , § I . The court
recognized that the challenged subdivision exaction legislation furthered these ··salutary
purposes" and hence should be sustained if at all possible. Associated Home Builders
of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3<l 633, 638-39, 484
P.2d 606, 6 1 1 , 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 635 (197 1). B u t the court's assessment of the legis
lation's validity turned on the police power analysis recoun ted in text, not upon the
cited constitutional provision.
162. Id. at 639, 484 P.2d at 6l l , 94 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
1 63. Id. at 637-41 , 484 P.2d at 610- 1 1 , 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634-35.
164. Id. at 640, 484 P .2d at 612, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
1 65. Id. at 648 n.6, 484 P .2d at 612 n.6, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 636 n.6.
166. Id. at 641-42, 484 P.2d at 613, 94 Cal. Rptr. a t 637. See note 1 55 supra.
1 67. Id. at 641-42, 484 P.2d at 613, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
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While Associated and its brethren are harbingers of j udicial ap
proval of development rights transfer, they fall short o f being con
clusive because differences i n the scope and struc ture168 of transfer
and exaction 'programs have made it unnecessary for the courts to
clearly enunciate an adequate leg a l rationale for the transfer tech
nique. Exactions, for example, have been employed for only a limited
number of objectives, including the acquisition of land. for educa
tional and recreational purposes, whereas development rights trans
fer programs m a y embrace a variety o f concerns. Despite their great
er reliance

u po n

the

police

power,

the

recent

opinions

remain

profoundly influenced by special assessment theory. The fact of more
pronounced benefits for the subdivision than for the overall com
munity remains the touchstone of even the most liberal decisions. In
contrast, benefits afforded by transfer programs are community-wide
in nature, rather than localized to the transfer district.
The case for development rights transfer ultimately rests on two
propositions which,
inforcing:

though independently based,

First, government may

are

mutually re

properly shift to developers and

landowners the cost of resource protection programs initiated to coun
teract the environmentally harmful effects of their land use deci
sions; and, second, government may finance these programs by re
capturing the i ncrement of the increase in land values attributable
to governmental actions and general community growth .
168. T he postures of the subdivider and the landowner within a tra n s fer district
vis·il·vis the subdivision exaction and the pu rchase of devel opmen t rig h ts, respectively,
are not paralle l . T h e subdivider m u s t s u b m i t to the exaction, but the landowner may
decline to con tri b u te to the resource protect ion effort by choosi n g not to pu rchase
development rights. Cast in option form, development rights transfer is more akin to
cluster zoning, see note 61 supra, and zoning bonuses, see note 33 suj;ra, than to sub
division exaction. Because of the nonman datory character of the former two techniques,
commentators have argued that they arc co n sidera b l y less vulnerable as uncom
pensated takings, assuming that the densities permit ted as of right under the p �·ograms
employing them a re not so restrictive as to be confiscatory. See Hanna, SubdJvisio11s:
Conditions lmfJosed by Local Govern 111e11t, 6 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 1 7� 1 83-84 (1966);
Mandelker, The Basic PhilosojJhy of Zoning: Ince11tive or Restrai11 t?, in NEw ZONING,
supra note 2 7 , at 1 6. Because thes e tech niques env isage a trade of increased density
for the prescribed ameni ty , the developer receives what one commentator has labeled
a "de facto q u i d pro quo." Mandelker, supra. Despite its plausibility, this reasoning
is subject in many states to the criticisms that com pensation must be paid in money,
not special benefi ts; that where special benefits arc an appropriate m ed i um of tender,
the value of develop ment rights may be deemed too speculative to permit an award
of development rights to so qualify; and t h a t the condemnee is enti tled to a con
demnation j ury i n a n y event. &e Chicago Plan, supra note 52, at 598 n.75. Further, it
can be persuasively argued that developmen t righ t s transfer docs entail a mandatory
exaction insofar as residual density levels w i t h i n transfer dis t ricts are del iberatel y skewed
below those j u stifi ed by market and substan tive planning criteria. The contention
would be that gove rnment is simply offerin g to sell back to the victim what it had
previously pu rloi n ed from him. Cf. Landa u , supra note 1 34, at 8 1 -82. I n view of these
uncertainties, the d isc ussion assumes that the burdens suffered b y landowners within
transfer districts <lo not differ in principle from those incurred by develope rs under
the subdivision exaction techniqu e.
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Both propositions are implicit, though u nrealized, i n the recent
subdivision exaction opinions.

Reliance on the first proposition is

apparent in the Associated court's sympathy for the Sierra Club's
assertion that subdivision exactions are valid even if their benefits
are enjoyed on a community-wide basis rather than localized prin
cipally within the subdivision.169
The second proposition is also reflected i n Associated,

but the

court's appreciation of the recoupment j ustification for subdivision
exactions is tepid at best. According to the court,
The rationale of the [subdivision exacti o n ] cases affirming con
stitutionality indicate that the dedication statutes are valid under
the state's police power. They reason that the subdivider realizes
a profit from governmental approval of a subdivision since his
land is rendered more valuable by the fact of subdivision, and
i n return for this benefit the city may require him to dedicate
a portion of his land for park purposes whenever the influx of
new residents will increase the need for park and recreational
facilities.170
By concentrating solely on the "fact of s ubdivision" as the cause of
the increase i n the value of private land, Associated and the prece
dents i t cites ignore capital improvement programs, public regula
tion of other lands within the jurisdiction, governmental measures
stimulating general community growth, and myriads of other i n itia
tives that create i n large part the economic framework for private
transactions in land.171 The court's reason ing, moreover, gratuitously
suggests the older "privilege" rationale for subdivision exactions, a
rationale which

even supporters of

broad

subdivision

powers for

local governments find distasteful.172 A firmer grasp of the theoretical
underpinnings of the recoupment justiJication would have enabled
the court to avert both difficulties.
Prescribing a narrower ambit for exactions than for transfers may
perhaps be warranted. Subdivision exaction programs are often piece
meal in conception and reflect an undeniable tendency to treat the
latest developer as a

target for financing facilities whose benefits

169. See p. 1 14 supra.
170. Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut
Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 644, 484 P.2d 606, 615, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 639 (1971).
1 7 l. See pp. 98-99 8c note 95 supra.
172. See, e.g., Johns lOf! , s upra n? t� 20, �� 88 1 ; Su bdivision Exactions, s upra note
_ j t d1c1al
.
.
l �O: .at 1 1 30. .The . clas�1c
opm10n uul mng
the privilege theory to sustain sub
�
_
d1v1S1on exactions is Ridgefield Land Co. v. C1ty
of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468 2 1 7 N.W. 58
(1928).
'
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are mainly of community-wide import.178 But the rationale for de
velopment rights transfer is not

so confined. Schemes such as the

Chicago Plan and the Puerto Rico proposal look to t h e overall land
developmen t process as the generator of funds for resource protec
tion and address more comprehensively the impact of individual de
velopment decisions upon the jurisdiction's total environmental fabric.
By establishing an explicit framework for equ itably a llocating re
source protection costs, transfer

programs should

a l la y j ustifiable

constitutional and policy concerns that attend any cos t-shifting de
vice. The cause of judicial apprehensiveness with subdivision ex
action programs, i n fact, is the absence of clear standards that the
courts can confidently invoke

to

prevent communities

from over

reaching the individual developer. Development rights transfer should
meet this concern by calling for a n inventory of the probable cost
of the jurisd iction's resource protection needs and providing for their
satisfaction through impositions t i ed

to the value o f development

that can reasonably be anticipated in transfer districts.

As express

components of the transfer progr a m , findings under both headings
may be challenged by affected l a n downers in litigation.
3.

Development Rights Transfer and Equal Protection
The Associated case also raised two equal protection issues that

draftsmen o f development rights transfer programs must an ticipate.
The plaintiffs argued that the c h a llenged legislation violated equal
protection by compelling contri bu tions only from developers subject
to the subdivision ordinance while leaving unaffected those not simi
larly constra i ned174 and that the l egislation would operate in an ex
clusionary m a n n er by raising the cost of housing for newcomers to
the commun i ty. 1 7 5 By analogy, developers and landowners within tra ns
fer districts may claim, first, that they are denied equal protection
because densities permi tted as of right outside of the district will be
more liberal

than those within t h e district, and, second,

that the

price builders pay for the development rights which would otherwise
be available by right will u l timately be passed on to the purchasers
173. Rejecting the special assessment analogy as too restrictive a foundation for
subdivision exac tions, Professor Johnston has properly observed:
The entire m u n icipality is a healthier, safer environment when s u bdivisions are
provided with adequate streets, water, sani tation, and open space. I t is this benefit
to the total com mu nity which sustains the exercise of the police power, rather
than the more d i rect benefit to the subdivision i tself.
Johnston, supra note 20, at 87 1 n.2 1 (emphasis added). See also id. at 901 -03, 923.
1 74. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 643-44, 484 P.2<l 606, 6 1 4 , 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 638 ( 1 97 1 ) .
1 7 5 . Id. at 648, 484 P.2d at 6 1 8 , 94 C a l . Rptr. a t 642.
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o f their projects. The merits o f these claims depend entirely upon
the details of the challenged transfer program, but A ssociated and
related precedents are persuasive that properly impl emented tra nsfer
programs will not fall on either count.
The Associa ted court rejected the first contention by impl icitly re
lying on the principle that a legislative classification comports w i t h
equal protection requirements i f i t i s based u pon

a

ra ti o n a l

cl is

tinction . 1 7 6 The same principle should immu nize development righ ts
transfer from effective assa u l t i f the j urisdiction can point to docu
mented economic and planning studies demonstrating

t hat

the areas

selected as transfer districts can reasonably be expected to be focal
points of future development.
Nor did the court find the exclusionary argu ment co m pell i n g I n
common with othe_r courts 1 77 and commentators,178 i t ex pressed gen
.

uine concern about the trade-off between resource protection ancl
achievement of other community objectives such as the prodµttio1} Q [
low q>st housing. 1 79 It properly recognized, moreover, that st;JJd iv·isiQn
exaction programs can be manipulated to achieYc excl usionary res.u I ts
and that even when not so abused may tend to rai;;e. · t he cost of t h e
developer's finished product . 1 80 The court pragm a t ically responded
to this dilemma by evaluating the program in l ig h t of the g r a Y i ty o f
the community's land u s e problems a n d t h e extent to w h ic h the
program in fact produced exclus ionary consequences.
A similar inquiry can be anticipated if a transfer progra m is im
pugned as exclusionary. And a similar outcome can be predicted for
thoughtfully formulated programs. If the progra m is institu ted be
fore developers acquire land within transfer districts, it is far from
certain that the cost of development rights will be passed on to hous
ing consumers. From the developer's perspective

it

is

immaterial

whether he pays the seller, or the seller and t h e government, as long
as the total price for the

land remains unchang·ed.

Using

a

t ec h



nique known by real estate a ppraisers as "residual land value anal
ysis,"181 the developer will i n all likelihood discount the price that
1 76. Id. at 643, 484 P.2d at 6 1 4 , 94 Cal. Rptr. at 638. See Dandridge v . W i l liams,
397 U.S. 471 ( 1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 ( 1 96 1 ) .
1 7 7 . See Steel Hill Development, Inc. v . Town o f Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 9 6 1
( l st C i r . 1972); cf. Golden v. Planning Board, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 378, 2 8 5 N .E.2d 29 1 ,
302, 334 N .Y.S.2d 1 38 , 152 ( 1 972).
1 78 . See, e.g., Harvith, Subdivision Dedication Requireine nls-Some Observatiu11s
and an A lternative: A Special Tax on Gains from Uealty' 33 ALBANY L. REv. 47-t
477-80 ( 1 969); Subdivision Exactions, supra note 1 1 0.
179. Associated Home Builders of the G reater East Ilay, Inc. "· City of Walnut
Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 648, 484 P.2d 606, 618, 94 Cal . Rptr. 630 642 ( 1 9 7 1 ) .
1 80. Id.
� 8 1 . Se� SrA�E ADRIFT,, s"!-pra note 33, at ch. 3 for an explanation and application of
this technique m determmmg the value of development rights within Chicago's Loop.
'

,
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he pays to the seller by the amou n t he must pay to the government
to secure the additional rights. Thus, the costs of the transfer pro
gram will be borne principally by landowners and speculators, not
by consumers . 1 8 2
Even if resource protection costs are shifted to consumers, it hardly
follows

that

courts will find

transfer programs

exclusionary.

De

velopment i n many transfer districts will be primari l y industrial or
commercial i n nature, 1 83 thus obviating the objection altogether. In
dependently of transfer programs, moreover, the cost of housing in
districts likely to become residen ti a l will often fall within the middle
income and luxury range, a circumstance that is not constitu tionally
troublesome i f the jurisdiction has made adequate provision for low
cost housing elsewhere within i ts boundaries.184 Nor can it be con
cluded witho u t refined economic projections that development rights
transfer will unduly raise costs i n transfer districts where low cost
housing is a nticipated.
Two final points bear emphasis in assessing the cost implications
of developme n t rights transfer, whe ther in conjunction with exclu
sionary zoning or other social concerns. First, a transfer program will
be only one component of the jurisdiction's land use plan . As such,
it should be accommodated with o th er goals. If, for exa m ple, a juris
diction is committed to increasing i ts supply of low i ncome housing,
it could exclude from considera tion as transfer districts areas con
taining probable sites for this housing.
Second, pain ful social and economic trade-offs are inevitable in
the nation 's quest for environmental quali ty. It is fanciful to assume
that resource protection will come w i thout a price tag either now
or in the future. Such assumptions, i n fact, have plunged the nation
into the environmental quagmire from which it is belatedly straining
to extricate i tself.
1 82. For a detailed analysis of the relationship between zoning a n d the price that
informed developers will pay for land, see id. at ch. 4. Significantly, House a11d Home,
the trade organ of the home building indus try, has enthusiastically en dorsed land in
crement value taxation on the ground that it would lower the price that developers
pay for land, thereby lowering the price of housing for the ultimate consumer. See 1 8
HOUSE AND HOME, Aug. 1960, passim.
183. Under t h e Chicago Plan, for example, it is contemplated that transfer dis
tricts will often coincide with the city's central commercial and office districts. See
Chicago Plan, supra note 52, at 594-96; SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 3 3 , at 49-50.
184. See, e.g., SASSO v. City of Union C i ty , 424 F.2d 291, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1970);
Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 1 1 7 N.J. Super. 1 1 , 1 5 · 1 6, 283
A.2d 353, 355-56 (Super. Ct. 1 972); cf. In re Appeal of Girsch, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A .2d
395 (1970). See generally Bigham & Bostick. Exclusionai·y Zonin fi Practices: A n Exami
_
nation
of the Curre n t Controversy, 25 VAND. L. REV. 1 1 1 1 ( 1 9 12); C u n n i ngham, The
Interrelationship Between Exclusionary Zoning and Exclusionary Subd ivisio_ n Con trol
A Second Look, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 290 ( 1 973); Comment, Modern Soczal Problems
and Land Use Regulation-The New Jersey ExjJe rience, 14 WM. & M AR Y L. REV. 732
(1 973); Annot., 48 A.L.R. 3d 1 2 1 0 ( 1 973).
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4.

Two additional issues may arise if local governments implement
transfer programs u nder legislation akin to the Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act . 1 85 I t may be argued that development rights transfer
violates the Act's uniformity requiremen t186 because some lots w it h in
a transfer district may be developed to greater maximum densit ies
than others. The second issue is whether the purposes section1 87 0£
the Act comprehends the broader environmental and amenity goals
that transfer progra ms envisage. Although the j udic ial gloss placed
on the Act in the half-century since its formulation appears ample
on both counts, amendment of the pertinent enabling legislation may
n evertheless be advisable.
a.

The " Uniform ity" O bjection
It is unclear in many jurisdictions whether the uniformity require

ment even applies to bulk regulations. 188 If it does, however, cluster189
and PUD 190 precedents, which have consistently sustained the dual
bulk system against the charge of nonun iformity, should be adequate
to obtain judicial approval of a transfer program. The uniformity
requirement, those precedents reason, mandates only that landowners
within the district

be afforded reasonable access

to the

increased

density offered by the density zoning measure. It is irrelevant whether
the development end product is in fact identical in terms of com
parative proj ect bulk, height, or area.
So construed, the u niformity requirement would be satisfied by
the development rights transfer proposal set forth in this article. The
relevant inquiry would be whether all landowners within the transfer
district enjoy equivalent access to the development rights that are
offered for sale there and not whether some landowners i n the dis
trict will ultimately build to greater densities than others by virtue
of the program. Care must be taken, therefore, to insure that pro
visions relating to the public offer and sale of the rights provide the
requisite access.
185. ADVISORY COMMITIEE ON ZONING, DEP'T OF CO MMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONI1'G
ENABLING ACT UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS (rev. e<l.

1926).
186. Id. § 2.
187. Id. § 3.
1 88. See cases cited in Chicago Plan, supra note 52, at 625 n.194.
189. See Prince George's County v. M & B Construction Corp., 267 Md. 338, 297
A.2d 683 (1 972); Chrinko v. South Brunswick Twp. Planning Bd., 77 N .J. Super. 594,
187 A.2d 221 (L. Div. 1963).
190. See Orinda Homeowners Comm. v. Board of Su pervisors, I I Cal. A p p 3d
768, 90 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970); Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc.' 429 Pa. 626 24 1
A.2d 81 (1968).
.

'
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b.

The· "Purposes" O bjection
For most courts today the purposes section of the Standard State

Zoning Enabling Act is virtually coextensive with the scope of the
police power.191 Particularly favored in recent decisions is the en
hancement

of

environmental quality

through

zoning

measures.192

Hence, it would be surprising i ndeed if a transfer p rogram were
struck down a s ultra vires. Whatever uncertainty may exist on this
point in a specific j urisdiction, however, can be erased a ltogether by
proper modification of zoning enabling legislation.
III.

Development Rights Transfer: Areas for Further Inquiry

The economic and planning ramifications of development rights
transfer .are largely uncharted terrain, not only for t h e lawyer, but
for the land economist and plann e r as well. Given t h e complexity
of potential problems, the gaps i n existing research, a n d the evident
dangers of i mplementing poorly conceived transfer programs, it is
obvious that extensive investigation and controlled experimentation
is necessary. The purpose of this section is to facilitate subsequent
inquiry by cataloguing the salient problems and by suggesting a modi
fied version of the transfer device-enacted as a taxing measure-that
may alleviate the thornier of these problems.
A.

Economic Questions
One set of questions is that which arises in determi ning the losses

that the owner or owners of the resource site incur u n d er the trans
fer program . A second is concerned with skewing the cost of devel
opment rights (or, correlatively, t h e residual densities within transfer
districts) at levels that generate the revenues needed for resource pro
tection without discouraging new construction in transfer districts.
191. For a summary of the variety of p u rposes that may legitimately be pursued
through zoning regulation, see URBAN PLANNING, supra note 122, at §§ 4 1 -52. The rare
case· in which a zoning measure serving a concededly valid police power objective is
invalidated as not in pursuance of a proper zoning purpose can typically be ex
plained on other grounds. In Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack,
!!3 N.Y.2d 424, 244 N.E.2d 700, 297 N .Y.S.2d 1 29 ( 1 969), for example, the court in
rnlidated a zoning measure barring further apartment construction which was passed
by the municipality to prevent pollution of the Hudson River by i nadequately treated
mu nicipal sewage. One ground of the decision was that pollution control is not a
proper zoning p u rpose. Alternatively, the court ruled that the ordinance was not en
acted in accordance with a comprehensive plan and hinted at its possible invalidity
on equal protection grounds as imposing upon the plaintiff a burden that should
have been borne by the community generally. Two years later, however, the former
proposition was overruled sub silentio by Salamar Builders Corp. v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y.2d
221, 275 N.E.2d 585, 325 N.Y.S.2d 933 ( 1 9 7 1 ), which sustained a zoning ordinance
increasing mini m u m lot sizes expressly to alleviate the pollu tion of local wells and
of the drainage reservoir serving the entire area.
192. See note IO supra.
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I . · The Protected Resource

The losses suffered at the resource site pose two issues: their
amount and the extent to which they are compensable under the
standards of the applicable transfer program. Resolving the first
issue requires a determination of the difference between the val ue
of the resource site before and after the restrictions are imposed.m
Although this task may be somewhat complicated by the character of
the threatened resource,1 9 4 it is one that appraisers routinely under
take when government acquires a less than fee interest in private
property.
Establishing how much, if any, of this loss is legally compensable
is less easily resolved. Despite endless litigation on this issue since
Euclid, the development of standards that are both rational and pre
dictable seems no closer to realization today.1 9'> Accountin g for the
issue's apparent intractability are the lack of an explicit, generally ac
cepted policy framework defining with reasonable precision the legiti
mate . economic expectations of those engaged in land development
and the assumption that the courts can adequately fashion such a
policy, unaided by legislative and administrative bodies.
Under transfer progrnms, however, a n administrative agency rather
than a court would address the compensation issue initially.196 The
agency's more sophisticated grasp of the complexities of land eco
nomics, sharpened by its day-to-day experience in administering the
transfer program, should prepare it to evaluate the impact of the
program's restrictions on specific resource sites. Compensable da mages
will be measured pursuant to statutory standards framed either as a
simple legislative incorporation of the constitutional ban against un
compensated takings19 7 or as a more detailed formul a that might,
for example, mandate a minimum rate of return for restricted sites.198
193. For a description and application o f these tech n i q ues to determine the eco
nomic damages suffered by owners of urban landmark propert ies sec SPACE ADRIFT,
supra note 33, at ch. 3. Other illustrations may be found in the cases an<l au
thorities cited in Ch icago Plan, supra note 52, at 6 1 7 n . 1 69.
194. Appraising the damages su ffered as .. a result of the imposition of permanent
landmark status o� a downtown office building, for ex a mple, is considerably more
complex than makmg a si\nilar determination regarding restrictions on u n improrcrl
land. See SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 33, at 176.
195. See authorities cited note 106 supra.
196. See p. 93 supra.
197. ALI MODEL L A ND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 4-402( 5) (Tent . Draft No. 5, I9i3)
illustrates this approach by directing a court in a condemnation action growi ng out of
restrictions upon a "development permission'" to include among the assu mp t io n s [that]
shall produce the highest market value" a condemnation award keyed t o " the mi11im un1
development necessary to eliminate the unconstitutional taking."
1 98. An example of this approach is found in the New York City landma rks
ordinance, which defines reasonable return as a net annual return of six percent on
the landmark property's assessed valuation. See NEW YoRK, N.Y. AnMIN. CODE ch. g.,\,
,

"

§ 207-1 .0q (1971).

1 22

Developmen t Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay

If the former standard is used t h e agency will employ the same
general premises in fixing compensation for the sites of threatened
resources that i t uses in selecting residual densities within transfer
districts. That

is,

the

value

of

the

most profitable

use

of those

sites will be discounted to reflect t h e extent to which i t i s a product
of community rather than private efforts and the degree to which
the harm posed by the sites' conversion to higher density use may
properly be proscribed under the police power. The latter standard
will entail greater involvement o f the legislative branch, probably
the key to ac_hieving a consensus concerning the legitimate economic
gain to be permitted from private land use and hence l i kely to be
given greater deference by the courts.
If the agency or a reviewing court determines that compensation
is due for a restriction, the j urisdi ction may pay the award and ac
quire a protective i nterest in the s i t e or i t may decli n e to do so and
instead rezone

the site to the most

restrictive dens i ty

compatible

with the applicable standards.199 I ts choice will depend in part, of
course, upon

the

availability

of

funds

generated

by

the

transfer

program and by other conventional revenue sources. Presumably it
will opt for t h e second course i f t hese funds are insufficient to pay
the award o r if, i n its judgment, t h ey ought instead be allocated to
protect other resources of greater relative merit.

2.

The Transfer District
In order

to

determine whether the demand

for new

construc

tion in an a rea proposed as a transfer district will be sufficient to
create an adequate market for development rights,
addressing, for

example, past and

market studies

projected land absorption rates,

existing or proposed public improvements within the area, and demo
graphic patterns should be made.200 Once a given area is established
as a likely target for intensive fu ture development, a transfer pro
gram must be designed to permit developers to build profitably un
der its controls. Overly harsh residual densities or development con
trols that offer l ittle financial advantage to the developer may spell
trouble in one of two forms. Developers may cannibalize the program
by bringing political pressure to dilute its stringent dens ity regime
or they may be frightened away from the transfer d i s trict al together,
choosing instead to build in ou tlying areas. I n neither case would
the commun i ty obtain the funds to finance its resource protection
199.

200.

See p. 94 supra.
See SPACE ADRIFT,

supra

note 33, at ch. 4.
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effort

in the latter

it

would unwittingly

sprawl. If these outcomes are to be avoided, the details of t_he trans
.
fer prognm must be closely meshed with market cond1t10ns and
requirements.
Planning Questions

B.

The major planning tasks associated with transfer programs are
identifying sites containing sensitive resources and devising 1·egub
tions to safeguard them, insuring that density trnnsfers do not create
design abuse, and coordinating transfers with other features of the
jurisdiction's comprehensive plan. The

first

task 'vill require the

hiring of qualified specialists knowledgeable about the cha rac teris t i cs
of the resources located in the transfer program area.

Preventing design abuse within transfer districts, while not with
out its technical challenges, should by no means be insuperable. A
dual bulk system does present design complications that are not en
countered under traditional bulk zoning. 201 Thus, suitable areas must
be selected as transfer districts; zoning trade-offs (including increased
floor area, tower coverage, or reduced lot size) which will be financially
attractive to developers without causing congestion or other undue
planning results must be identified. Generally successful results un
der zoning bonus, cluster, and PUD programs-each of which allo
cates density with as much flexibility as a transfer program-demon
strate that the technical difficulties inherent in these functions should
prove manageable.202 Development rights transfer, in fact, may well
be

less

difficult

to

administer

than

these

other

flexible

zonmg

initiatives.203
201. For an enumeration of these risks in the context of urban landmark preser
vation and of appropriate safeguards to offset them, see SrACE ADRIFT, supra n ote 33,
at ch. 5.
202. See generally NEW ZONING, supra note 27; W. WHYTE, supra note 61.
203. In allowing additional density on the same site as the amenity that the com
munity "purchases" with this dens ity, they create palpable risks of congestion on
that �ite. To ayoid ;ongestioi:i, planners must limit density to an amount t hat the
_
amenity _can digest: , See Chicago Plan, supra note 52, at 594 n.69. Calculatmg this
amount is a two-step operation: a ratio must be fixed between a stated inc1·emc11t of
density and its co1'.sequences in ter�s of design compatibility with surrounding de
velo pment and of uicreased po �ulat1on and atl�ndant loads on pub li c facilities and
services; and, second, the capacity of the amcmty-be it a park, arcade, or subway
concour�e-to oifset these. consequences must be projected. That the se calculations are
_
less a job for the shde rule than for informed guesswork appears in Ada Louise
Huxtable'_s comment th ":t the "point at which inc1:eased density tips the scales againsc
planned improvements is a matter for the Delphic Oracle." Thi11hi11g Ma11's Zoning,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1971, § 2. at 22, col. 5.
Neither the digestion rationale nor its speculativ� c alcul<;ttions pertains in a transfer
.
_
context because density 1s transferred to a geographically distant transfer d i stric t rather
than added to the resource site. Total density for the latter is fixed just as it would
•.
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Coordinating a transfer program with the jurisdiction's compre
hensive plan will undoubtedly provide the most severe test for de
velopment

rights transfer. Regrettably,

the phrase

"comprehensive

plan" is often little more than a euphemism for a melange of land
use policies-or nonpolicies-that happen to prevail in a jurisdiction
at any given point in time. The neat formulations of planning the
orists notwithstanding, this "plan" is typically more reflective of lob
bying activities and other realities of the land development process
than of conscious strategies adopted in pursuance of selected com
munity goals to advance the public interest. Not only is a transfer
program unlikely to work under such circumstances, but it could
well compound existing distortions in the local planning picture.
Public officials can react to these unpleasant observations by dis
missing development rights transfer as

intriguing

but

impractical,

or, hopef ully, by upgrading the quality of their planning efforts.2 04
They could also choose to minimize these technical problems by sub
stituting for density transfers an outright tax upon all or selected
kinds of development.205 Since n o density would be transferred un
der this approach, the community's physical planning regime would
be no more subject to distortion than it is under traditional bulk
zoning.
This approach is attractive on other grounds as well. Because the
transfer program would be implemented as a taxing measure, neither
a showing o f benefits correlated with the levy nor of the injurious
impact of land development on the general welfare would be neces
sary. 206 The jurisdiction must demonstrate only that the levy is for
be for a traditional bulk district except that it is not a unitary figure but a com
posite of residual density plus the additional density that landowners there may
purchase in the form of development rights.
204. The call for improved planning is more than an academic remedy. Congress,
the American Law Institute, state legislatures, and the foundations are moving dramati·
cally to afford technical and financial support. The electorate too has become in·
creasingly conscious of and distressed by the formerly hidden costs of inadequate public
land use control, much of it traceable to inferior planning. America's "new mood," in
short, could provide the impetus for a sophisticated, sustained planning commitment
which, in remedying many of the nation's land use deficiencies, could alleviate as well
the design risks that inhere in development rights transfer.
205. See Harvith, supra note 178, passim; S!lbdivision Exactions, supra note 110, at
I146-54; Doebelc, Improved State Enabling Legislation for the Nineteen-Sixties, 2
NATURAL REs. J. 321, 341-42 (1962), for evaluations of the legality and merits of en
acting subdivision legislation within a taxing rather than a police power rubric. A
license tax upon the business of constructing dwellings keyed to the number of bed·
rooms per dwelling was sustained in Associated Home Builders of the Greater East
Bay, Inc. v. C ity of Newark, 18 Cal. App. 3d 107, 95 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1971), com
mented upon in 23 ZONING DIGEST 231 (1971).
206. Cf. Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Newark,
18 Cal. App. 3d 107, 95 Cal. Rptr. 648 ( 1 971) (sustaining as an occupation tax a
levy on developers keyed to the number of bedrooms included in their projects).
See pp. ll2-l 7 supra.
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a proper governmental purpose,207

a

characterization that is self

evident given the program's goal of resource protection. In the legis
lative arena where the question of the tax's social equity would be
addressed, the rationale for development rights transfer set forth in
this article would be as cogent for the taxing alternative as for the
police power alternative.
A host of additional advantages would result if the tax were im
posed broadly on all or most forms of new construction. The equal
protection difficulties associated with the special burdens suf fered
by landowners within transfer districts208 would be reduced because
there would not be a sharp distinction between lands within and
lands outside of the district. Eliminating this distinction would also
reduce the dangers of program dilution and of development that
leapfrogs transfer districts.209 Further, enlarging the incidence of the
imposition would dilute the exclusionary zoning objection210 because
resource protection costs would be borne by a larger class of land
owners and developers than under the police power alternative. It
would likely generate greater revenue as well.
Finally, in that all or most new construction would be requir e d
to contribute to the resource protection effort, a broad-based tax.
would also be more consistent with the fact that the land develop
ment process is essentially indivisible. So conceived, the taxing al
ternative would generate a community "Environmental Trust Fund''
financed by "users" of the environment much as the national High
way Trust Fund211 is supported by a variety of levies upon users of
America's highways.
Despite the tax proposal's obvious merits and the current appeal of
environmental issues, popular resistance to further taxation of any
kind could prove insurmountable. Further, the planning advantages
other than resource protection that density transfers afford212 woul d
largely be lost. Choice of the type of tax-property, income, or excise
-and the proper taxing vehicle are

pregnant with economic and

administrative consequences which, although different, are potentially
as

troublesome as the design risks of the police power approach. Op t-

207. See 1 COOLEY, supra note llO, at § 174; 16 McQUILLIN, Mu;-.;1cIPAL CORPORATIONS, Taxation § 44.35 (1972 rev. vol.).
208. See pp. 117-18 supra.
209. See p. 123 supra.
210. See pp. 117-19 supra.
211. For a concise des cription of the Highway Trust Fund, see J. Buol.\NAN, Tm
PUBLIC FINANCES 553-70 (rev. ed. 1965). Another commentator has also noted the ap·
peal of a trust fund approach. See Wexler, supra note 42, at 203-04.
212. See p. 101 supra.
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ing for a land increment value tax, for example, requires prescribing
standards for distinguishing "earned" from "unearned increments,"
upgrading existing assessment procedures and personnel, and nurtur
ing a political framework that insures evenhanded, consistent treat
ment of property owners . 21a
The tax and the density transfer approaches proceed f rom the same
policy foundation, call for similar background studies, would be ad
ministered by cognate staffs using parallel procedures, and would
have largely equivalent economic consequences for resource owners,
developers, and landowners.

From a research viewpoint, therefore,

they need not be regarded as mutually exclusive because inquiry into
their feasibility can be conducted on a joint basis. From the perspec
tive of legislative strategy, the choice between the two will depend
in large part upon whether planning risks or popular objection to
the imposition of a new tax is perceived as more objectionable.

Conclusion
The central argument advanced in this article is that the develop
ment potential of private property is in part a community asset al
locable to serve the community's needs. As im plemented· under de
velopment rights transfer this principle vastly expands government's
economic

and

planning leverage over private land

use decisions.

Concomitantly, it places the leadership and administrative burden for
resource protection more squarely on government's shoulders.
Government must not permit the real estate community or over
zealous environmentalists to make the transfer program a captive of
their special interests, or, failing this, to dilute or scuttle it. It must
frankly communicate to the public that, like any other resource pro
tection initiative, development rights transfer comes freighted with
a mix of costs and benefits, chief among the former being the zoning
adjustments or development charges of the police power and taxing
approaches. It should be alert ·to the larger social and economic
trade-offs that density transfers cause, fashioning and m anaging its
transfer

program to achieve

resource protection

without running

roug·hshod over other community goals. It must insulate the transfer
prog!,am from planning and design amateurs by assembling an ade
quately funded and qualified planning staff and b y supporting the
staff's initiatives against unwarranted political interference. Finally,
213.

See generally authorities cited note 95 supra.
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the inherent possibility of

favoritism that development rights transfer shares with other public
programs which distribute lucrative franchises and privileges on the
basis of flexible criteria.
Expanded governmental land use initiatives are imperative to hold
the line on further environmental deterioration. The risks of devel
opment rights transfer, therefore, must be assessed against those of
available or proposed alternatives, not against some supposed trouble
free ideal. Two such alternatives-the traditional harm/benefit test
and the proposal that compensation for governmental interference with
private land use be limited to the sole case of actual appropriation
of private land-have been considered in tandem with development
rights transfer with this purpose in mind. Measured against them and,
more fundamentally, against the current land use ferment, develop
ment rights transfer could well be an idea whose time has come.
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